Turning to Aquinas on Virtue

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Introductory

My aim is to urge those of us friendly to Aristotelian work on virtue to turn to Aquinas. Aquinas's work on virtue is of a piece with his theology, and this may be part of the reason he has received less attention from those of us studying virtue outside the confines of Christian intellectual work. But his understanding of what a virtue is and what a virtue does is helpful even if we do not share his confessional commitments, and his work on the nature and structure of the virtues takes us beyond what we have from Aristotle. Aquinas's understanding of virtue, like Aristotle's, is based in a view of human nature, but Aquinas has a different account of the depth of our need for virtue than Aristotle offers, and, in principle, at least, an account that holds that human beings as such (rather than just a tiny, privileged population of male citizens) could be virtuous.

Aquinas thinks that we tend to suffer from darkened intellects, disturbed passions, and disordered wills. Thomists tend to trace this condition to our fall from grace. But for anyone who occasionally reads the newspaper, watches television, or laments things that family members, friends, neighbors, civic leaders, or other people do, the diagnosis may be no more than a concise description of our lot. We often find it hard to direct our energies toward long-term, lasting good when doing so will prevent us from pursuing more immediate gain, or toward the common good when this looks to be at odds with private advantage. The diagnosis captures something of what goes on when we lie, cheat, steal, or commit acts like murder, rape, fraud, or torture (on however grand a scale), but also in the thousand small occasions when we are impatient, selfish, moody, dishonest, ungenerous, overly generous, or foolish. What interests me is not the breathtaking commonality of bad judgment, bad responses, bad habits, and bad deeds. It is rather the extraordinary fact that perfectly ordinary people know better. We may not put this knowledge to good use. We may not seek to improve ourselves. But we know better. And because we know better we also know to be struck by our fellows' patience, kindness, justice, honesty, temperance and courage. Given that one can notice the descriptive accuracy of the phrase "darkened intellect, disturbed passions, and

disordered will" *without* adverting to revelation, the fact that we know better should be striking.

It could be objected that this is a merely conceptual point. The phrase is about privation. It is not possible to understand privation without trying to frame some account of the good that is blocked, impeded, or otherwise made less by privation. Perhaps people just pick up on the implicit contrast. Picking up on the implicit contrast could even be how we know *what* to criticize in others. But we also use points summarized in this phrase against *ourselves*. Anyone who has deployed such material self-critically will understand the peculiar form of apparently self-generated and appropriate humility that comes of vivid appreciation of her or his own failings. The only way to make sense of this experience is to suppose that we are not utterly benighted. Some spark, some bright corner carries an understanding of the way in which we are, frankly, *a mess* by carrying some sense of what things might be if we were well ordered. Assuming, as seems plausible, that none of us has much experience with an entirely well ordered human being, we should be *at least* as struck by the fact that we know better as we are by the fact that we frequently fall short.

For Aquinas, cultivation of virtue helps to remedy this situation, and even though very few of us will develop harmonious reasonable practical orientations directed at good without discipline and training, Aquinas, like Aristotle, takes it

that we are nevertheless drawn that way. Fundamentally, we seek to pursue good and avoid evil, which is why we have it in us to work to improve ourselves in the first place. Michael Sherwin puts the point this way:

> We acquire the virtues (the dispositions of character) necessary for an adult moral life by repeatedly performing acts that are in accord with virtue. This occurs through a moral apprenticeship. At first we do what virtue demands because we are disciplined if we don't. Gradually, however, we begin to acquire a taste for the joys inherent to doing the right thing, and we begin to imitate the actions of those whom we admire. Doing deeds of temperance, courage, and justice, and making the practical judgments that these actions require, we acquire the four principal virtues of the moral life on the natural level. These virtues dispose us to act in accord with natural human flourishing and the common good of the temporal community.
>
> None of this would be possible without the natural principles underlying the intellect and will. The practical intellect in every act of knowing naturally apprehends the principles of practical reasoning (or what Aquinas elsewhere describes as the precepts of the natural law: that good is to be done, evil is to be

> avoided, and so on), while the will simultaneously naturally inclines toward the good in general and toward the particular goods that promote natural human flourishing. In other words, the fact that we can acquire virtues that dispose us to act rightly with regard to the *means* toward human flourishing presupposes that there exist in us principles inclining us toward human flourishing as our natural *end*.[1]

One could argue that some sort of system of social pressure and incentives drove the process of self-improvement for most of us, rather than an innate tendency to pursue good and avoid evil, and it is certainly the case that social life gives specific direction to both our pursuits and our avoidances. Like Aristotle, Aquinas takes it that sociality is crucial to human nature, and that social life is the arena in which we work to develop our characters. Beyond this, there are strong conceptual reasons to embrace the thought that it belongs to human beings to pursue what they take to be good and avoid what they take to be evil. It would take me considerably beyond the scope of this essay to argue the point, but there has been strong work recently urging that without supposing some such orientation we have no coherent way of making sense of human action, emotion, or volition. [2]

How does cultivation of virtue help us develop sound practical orientations, according to Aquinas?

Before and After

For Aquinas, human nature as we know it is fallen nature—we are, he thinks, operating at a loss. Following P. De Letter, I take it that Aquinas thought that original sin deprived humankind of original justice (as Thomas says, over and over again).[3]

How did things stand for us before the fall, according to Aquinas?

Eileen Sweeney puts it this way: "What is strange about Aquinas's view is that a purely 'natural state' of humankind has strictly speaking never existed; before the fall nature had a kind of supernatural strength, and after that, nature is somewhat, though not radically, depleted."[4]

The "supernatural strength" in original justice was a matter of orientation and governance: the human's higher powers were subject to God, the lower powers to the higher powers, and the body to the soul; (Aquinas adds a fourth subjection in his commentary on Romans: before the fall exterior things were subject to humankind such that they served the human and the human was not harmed by them).[5] In the prelapsarian condition, perfect rectitude of the will was possible. In the prelapsarian condition humans could act on their innate love of God

without impeding themselves. This is the sense in which the gift of original justice *perfects* human nature: it places our powers in proper order, given the kind of creatures we are. The supernatural strength that made the body subject to the mind and exterior things subject to us without any effort on our parts is gone from temporal human life. We do, however, recognize reasonable judgment, actions, and passions as possible. We also recognize these as belonging to a good human life, and as requiring discipline and training.

Now, many of us do not think that there was any state of grace from which we fell. We do not think that being able to act from love of God without impediment constitutes the appropriate condition for the human being. For the sake of the broadly atheistic cast of contemporary moral philosophy in the analytic tradition, I will leave God to the side for a moment. I will turn from God to the less exalted good. Virtue is supposed to make us good and help us lead good human lives. I do not think it should surprise us that the ethical is challenging for us.

As far as we know, humans are the most psychologically complex and materially powerful mammals—mammals capable of so altering the world in which they find themselves that they change the climate, of finding themselves volitionally and emotionally frozen in the face of a thought, or filled with joy or sorrow or fear over a movie, a story, a song, or the view. Why *wouldn't*

psychologically complex mammals drawn in different and conflicting directions by appetite, emotion, and thought find an overall orderly, practical orientation to good hard to achieve? If we start life with a darkened intellect, disturbed passions, and a disordered will, our powers do not come ready-made for harmonious pursuit of good.

It could be argued that inordinate inclinations or passions cloud the intellect seriously enough to pervert judgment, and so *make* the intellect dark. Those clouds are the source of the darkness. Perhaps this is what disorders the will. There are passages in Aquinas that suggest this, and certainly a lot of the symptoms that point to the disarray at issue in the diagnosis look to involve excessive or deficient passions or inclinations. I urge a different interpretation of Aquinas's map of where we land after the fall. The interpretation is fairly simple—what is lost is original justice; original justice is an ordering of mentality and will that allows us to direct ourselves to good appropriately; the darkening of the intellect *consists* in our finding ourselves in a situation where intellect is no longer directed to good, and the lower powers are no longer subject to reason.[6] Just as the first is the most important in original justice, its loss is the most important loss incurred through original sin for Aquinas. Rational appetite no longer effectively operates in and from practical wisdom. Because of this, the passions are disturbed. Although it is most common to emphasize the

ramifications of the loss of original justice in terms of the loss of the downward subjections—intellect to good, lower powers to higher powers, body to soul—one could just as easily emphasize the upward inclination toward good that is impeded by the loss of original justice. Impediment, notice, is not the same as obliteration.[7] The corrective supplied by virtues like temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence is meant to address the loss of the kind of governance proper to our natures, given the kind of creatures that we are, to begin to re-integrate our powers—or at least to foster cooperation among them—in a way that helps to rectify the will. In effect, the darkening of human intellect is the loss of the order in inclination and governance that helps us to direct ourselves to the goods it belongs to us to pursue.

Higher and Lower Powers

Most contemporary analytic moral philosophers use the terms *reason* and *rational* to cover many aspects of specifically and distinctively human mentality. The term covers at least the whole of what gets translated as *reason, understanding*, and *intellect* in Aquinas. Our higher natural powers, for Aquinas (as for Aristotle) are rational powers. Powers are potential strengths characteristic of kinds of beings. Powers are made actual through their exercise or use. The standard philosophical view has it that many species of animals have

fundamentally similar powers of sense and appetite, but that humans have an extra power—reason—that is, as it were, added onto the animal to give us the human.[8] Cutting edge analytic neo-Aristotelians nowadays reject this thought because they think that it is a mistake to treat reason as though it were, in Matthew Boyle's phrase, an "add on." Boyle distinguishes what he calls "additive" accounts of reason from "transformative" accounts. He writes:

> The crucial difference between additive and transformative theorists is not that additive theorists admit, whereas transformative theorists deny, that the minds of rational and nonrational creatures have something in common… Additive theorists advocate a certain way of understanding what we have in common with nonrational animals: they hold that there must be a distinguishable factor in rational powers of perception and action which is *of the very same kind* as the factor which wholly constitutes merely animal powers of perception and action. Transformative theorists, by contrast, locate the similarity between rational and nonrational mentality in a different sort of explanatory structure. They hold that rational mentality and nonrational mentality are different *species* of the *genus* of animal mentality. What the two 'have in common,' on this view, is not a separable factor that is

> present in both, but a generic *structure* that is realized in fundamentally different ways in the two cases. Rational and nonrational animals do not share in the sensory and conative powers of *nonrational animals*; they share in the sensory and conative powers of *animals*, where this is a generic category of power that admits of two fundamentally different sorts of realization. [9]

This is a very different understanding from one that holds that the cats and humans in my home have the same animal mentality, but that the humans have reason added on top of this in some way that accounts for the difference between ordering soup at a restaurant and meowing when hungry.

I realize that there are many passages in Aquinas that look to be amenable to an "additive" interpretation of Aquinas's account of human mentality. But there are also many that do not. And when Aquinas discusses the powers of the soul, it is fairly clear that his focus is on what Boyle calls "generic categories" that admit of fundamentally different kinds of realization. Consider, for example, the varieties of realization at issue in inclination or tendency or appetite for Aquinas. Even if, as Anthony Kenny recommends,[10] we confine our attention to Aquinas's thought about living things and reject the Aristotelian metaphysics that gives us fire tending toward heaven and stones tending toward earth,[11] Aquinas seems to

have what Boyle calls general *categories* of processes in view, and to be alive to radical differences in the ways these are realized in different kinds of beings. Further, Aquinas has the material necessary to hold that *reason* (as contemporary philosophers use the term) is also a category that admits of "fundamentally different sorts of realization." Angelic intellect, for example, is fundamentally different from human intellect in Aquinas, and Aquinas allows for varieties of nonhuman animal reason as well. Angels may be the only nonhuman creatures endowed with what Aquinas calls *intellect*, and are certainly the only nonhuman creatures he credits with free will, but they are *not* the only cognitively complex nonhuman creatures. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this point a kind of centerpiece in his Carus Lectures. He writes:

> Aquinas follows Aristotle in this. Nonhuman animals are, he allowed, 'moved by precepts' and on occasion learn from past experience to recognize this or that as friendly or hostile. In virtue of their nature and of such capacity for learning as they have, they are able to make what Aquinas calls 'natural judgments.' So they do exhibit what Aquinas calls 'a semblance of reason' and 'they share in' what he calls 'natural prudence.'[12]

On the transformative reading of Aquinas, the job of the virtues is to foster cooperation of the specifically human being's higher and lower powers in an overall pursuit of specifically human good.

Seven virtues are the most important for Aquinas—four cardinal virtues (practical wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage, together with three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity). For atheist neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists the cardinal virtues will be the more important.

Cardinal Virtues

Aquinas thinks that he takes from Aristotle an account of four acquired virtues—four virtues got through the process Sherwin described—as the principal virtues: practical wisdom,[13] justice,[14] courage,[15] and temperance (or moderation)[16]. Aquinas spells out in some detail why these are cardinal virtues and how we need all of them to act well without impeding ourselves.

Following Aristotle broadly, Aquinas takes it that a virtue brings the full and appropriate actualization of a human power—one that allows for both the upward inclination of passions and appetite toward reason and the downward governance of passion and appetite by reason actualized in overall pursuit of the good. Michael Pakaluk puts the point this way:

> A virtue is a trait that...makes someone such that his activity—what he does, what he is responsible for—is reasonable. But there are four basic types of such activity: his thinking itself, as practical and directed at action; his actions ordinarily so-called...; and how he is affected. This last category splits into two, Aquinas thinks, on the grounds that acting reasonably in the realm of the passions involves regulating both the passions by which we are drawn to something and the passions by which we are repulsed from something. These two sorts of passions imply two sorts of tasks or achievements...which the ordinary distinction between the virtues of moderation and courage confirms (*ST* I-2.61.2 resp.).[17]

Aquinas's account of virtue relies heavily on these points from Aristotle. Aristotle's work is broadly consistent with treating practical wisdom (prudence in Aquinas's terminology) as the virtue responsible for sound practical thinking and judgment—it is a virtue *of the intellect* directed to the will. Justice (for Aquinas) is a virtue *of the will* directed at extra-mental actions—primarily those that concern giving each his due.[18] Jean Porter underscores this point and urges taking its full generality seriously:

> As a virtue of the will, justice is the only cardinal virtue which directly concerns the distinctively human capacity for rational

> desire. Moreover, it is the cardinal virtue directly concerned with external actions, and as such, it includes most of the norms of nonmaleficence and respect for others...[19]

As Pakuluk noted, moderation and courage are virtues of passions: temperance renders attractions to desirable things reasonable, and courage is charged with reasonable aversion—principally, with controlling our fear so that we can be appropriately steadfast. Crudely, then, prudence corrects for darkened intellect in the practical sphere, moderation and courage for disturbed passions, and justice for a disordered will. Aquinas thinks that he takes from Aristotle an understanding of practical wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage as the four cardinal, principal virtues, all of which must be cultivated if one is to lead a good human life.[20]

The Structure and Operation of Virtue

Now, contemporary virtue theorists recognize many virtues that played no part in Aristotle's work—hope, for example, and humility and gratitude. For Aquinas, hope as a virtue belongs among those strengths of character that are divinely infused. Ordinary hope counts, for Aquinas, as an emotion rather than a virtue. Accordingly, I will leave hope to the side for the moment. Humility and gratitude, however, can count as acquired secondary virtues in Aquinas.

Secondary virtues are annexed to cardinal virtues to fortify and assist the operation of the cardinal virtues. All acquired virtues—cardinal and secondary—have their source in our efforts to build good character, their object in the proper order of human mentality and action, and their end in a good individual human life.

Unsurprisingly, Aquinas treats gratitude as properly annexed to justice (*ST* II-II, qq. 106-107). The virtue that we name *humility* involves aspects of justice that Aquinas treats under the headings of *religion*, *piety* and *respectfulness for those in authority* (*ST* II-II qq. 101-105).

As is true for hope in Aquinas, and for any acquired virtue on his scheme, gratitude and humility also may be treated as virtues that go beyond anything we can conjure on our own through discipline and training, beyond a strength directed at a good life for an individual human being, and beyond a trait that is meant to contribute to individual happiness. They may be treated as virtues whose object and aims involve goods beyond temporal happiness. Such are the infused virtues in Aquinas. Hope is an infused virtue for Aquinas—a gift from God with God as its object and beatitude as its end.[21]

All of the acquired cardinal virtues have infused counterparts in Aquinas's scheme. This aspect of Aquinas's thought has been the subject of tremendous controversy, even among scholars friendly to Aquinas's work in

general.[22] I agree with those who argue that infused virtues are indispensable for Aquinas. Given the object, source, and end of infused virtues, atheistic moral philosophy cannot simply adopt Aquinas's work on the topic. One aspect of the gratuitous work done for us through infused virtue, however, can find a home in standardly atheistic virtue theory.

Higher Good

Return, for a moment, to Aquinas on the loss of original justice. In the more-than-merely-natural state of original justice, *all* the powers characteristic of human nature were well ordered, and this affected *all* the operations of the thereby integrated human being. I take it that the chief sense in which our intellect is darkened through original sin is just this: original sin impedes the ordering of reason to good. As such, it impedes the coordinated operations of all other aspects of human mentality in the service of genuine good. Infused virtue is a gift from God that takes God as its object and union with God as its end. Put into the terms of what Thomists treat as temporal life—human life as we know it and live it—some virtues are oriented to higher goods—goods that go beyond the flourishing, even the capacities, of an individual human being, goods that are inherently self-transcendent. In this sense, acquired gratitude will focus on the goods we have because of others. Higher gratitude, however, will go to good

aspects of our lives and circumstances that are not the direct effects of our own or other people's actions—the sort of gratitude that sometimes finds expression in in noticing one's great good fortune, or in deep appreciation of many aspects of one's life felt in response to a lively awareness of human vulnerability—a sense that things could have gone otherwise and have been much worse. Higher humility may involve not merely an appreciation of one's own strengths and limitations, but a cultivated appreciation of how little human beings in general have accomplished or come to understand and appreciate. And higher hope will be more than an optimistic tendency to look for the silver lining in clouds and the sunnier side of difficulties—it will step in to stave off despair when there is no good reason at all to think that circumstances are likely to improve. In this sense, higher hope will serve as a tremendously important annex to courage, helping us to be steadfast even when the odds appear to be against us.

I realize that this is no more than a sketch of how to accommodate something of the importance of Aquinas's work on infused virtue in a context that cannot leave room for infused virtue. I take it that the most important aspect of trying to draw insight from Aquinas for atheistic virtue theory rests in seeing that infused virtues alter the context in which ordinary acquired virtue operates by rendering virtuous activity crucially self-transcendent.

By Way of a Conclusion

I began by pointing out that one didn't need revealed knowledge about God's acts in order to appreciate the descriptive accuracy of the phrase "darkened intellect, disturbed passions, disordered will" as a reasonable diagnosis of how things are with us. I mentioned that I thought that when we make errors in thought, action, judgment, and response, we very often know better, and that the fact that we somehow know better is at least as interesting as the fact that we fail. In this very brief and rapid tour through some of Aquinas's work, I have attempted to use a transformative interpretation of Aquinas on intellect as a way to begin to get at the sense in which we know better even if the many errors that we make are made routinely by most of the other people with whom we interact. Given this picture of temporal human life, Aquinas develops a strongly corrective account of virtue. I think that since even atheistic philosophers *can* embrace the catchphrase diagnosis of the human condition, and since we understand the whole human person as directed to good, we ought to embrace a corrective account of virtue. One other obvious alternative is to follow Aristotle even more closely than we like and to emphasize that only a handful of exceptionally privileged men can even hope to attain virtue anyway, so widespread disorder is of no great importance. Very few contemporary theorists of virtue are willing to follow Aristotle there.

Contemporary analytic neo-Aristotelians have raised two sorts of objections to corrective accounts of virtue. The first is just that a corrective account of virtue suggests that, somehow, our natures are flawed, which strikes some as anti-Aristotle.[23] To allay this concern, we can draw on Aquinas's discussion of the sense in which Adam had all of the virtues.[24] Modifying Aquinas's language a bit to bring it in line with analytic philosophical tastes, we can urge that the virtues are nothing but those cultivated habits whereby reason is directed to the highest good it grasps, and emotions and actions are regulated by reason.[25] It belongs to our kind to be so directed, and it is no strike against human nature that virtues equip us to put this natural orientation into practice.

The second sort of objection goes like this: If we understand the virtues as corrective, why should we suppose unity of the virtues?[26] For instance, if someone just happens to have moderate appetites, she wouldn't seem to have much need for temperance. If she is generous without being foolish, why should she need the same correctives that greedy or foolish people need? On the transformative account, what unifies the specific virtues *isn't* the passions or emotions that they happen to regulate. It is the end served by virtue: the well ordered human being who, insofar as well ordered, acts well.

It will take time to work out the detail of these matters, but the task is relatively straightforward, as these things go.

The monumental task for analytic neo-Aristotelian ethics will come in giving some account of the nature of the good that is supposed to orient the whole human being, and of how it is that something of this good makes itself felt in beings who find themselves in the kind of mess and muddle that apparently is our lot. It is one thing to point out that we see in ourselves an apparently insatiable appetite for some kind of fulfillment that appears to be forever just out of reach. Nothing is easier than amassing anecdotal evidence for some such point. But it is another thing entirely to give an account of the good at issue that is meant to unify both the person and those specific virtues that help to steady her aim at this good. The challenge of doing so without adverting to divinity is immense.

It isn't that nothing in analytic philosophy is directed to this problem. Whole analytic philosophical sub-industries have sprung from the felt need for one or the other aspect of the account required here. For example, some analytic philosophers have run after something they call *wholeheartedness*,[27] or something they call *integrity*,[28] or something they call *resolute choice* or *commitment*,[29] or something they call a proper *project* (rather than a plain intention) in the hope of capturing the sense that it belongs to human mindedness to have some sort of unified practical focus and direction.[30] Others have embraced the term *flourishing* for what specific virtues are supposed to *at once* enable *and* evince.

They have tried to *explain* flourishing by rehearsing a catalogue of various good things that a human being might do or enjoy in the course of his maturity, with the strong suggestion that virtue equips him to get and/or to do these things.[31] Some have become alarmed at the thought that wicked people seem to get and do some good things. Some have worried about the fact that virtuous people sometimes suffer. Some have thrown up their hands at the possibility that one of us might get and do the good things without going to the pain and bother of cultivating virtue.

Now, the literatures to which I allude do *not* understand themselves as addressing different aspects of a *single* problem. In this sense, very few analytic philosophers see their way clear to embracing a transformative account of reason in any detail, even if they see that we need such a thing. Partly because of this, as near as I can tell, analytic ethics has made very little progress in understanding virtue, reason or will. I hope that it might help us to entertain the possibility that giving an account of the good that might order human mentality, *and* how the need for it makes itself felt in individual human beings, *and* how this good unifies virtues, *and* the sense in which a natural inclination for this good unifies appropriately self-governing persons are different aspects of a *single* problem rather than many and diverse topics having no relation to each other. Here too, I think, analytic ethics has a lot to learn from St. Thomas.

NOTES

• I am grateful to Hank Vogler and Jay Schleusener for discussion of earlier drafts of this paper.

[1] Michael S. Sherwin, OP, "Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A test case for the Thomistic theory of infused cardinal virtues," *The Thomist*, 73 (2009), pp. 37-38.

[2] See, for example, Matthew Boyle and Douglas Lavin, "Goodness and Desire," in Sergio Tennenbaum, editor, *Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 161-201.

[3] P. De Letter, S. J., drew his chronology of Aquinas's corpus from M. Grabmann, the order of the chief texts in support of the view that the fall deprived us of original justice is the following: 1) II *Sent*., d. 20, q. 2, a. 3; d. 29, q. 1, a. 2; d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; 2) IV *SCG,* c. 52; 3) *ST*., I, q. 95, a. 1, c and ad 5; q. 100, a. 1, c and ad 2; 4) *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, c and ad 1 and 2 (*e tertia serie obi*.); q. 5, a. 1; 5) *ST* I-II, q. 82, a. 3; 6) *Expositio in Epist. ad Roman*, c. 5, lect. 3; 7) *Compendium Theologiae,* c. 186. c. 192, and c. 196. See De Letter, "Original Sin, Privation of Original Justice," *Thomist*, 17 (1954): 469-509. Newer translations render *iustitia originalis* as "original righteousness" rather than "original justice." And, in a move that may have nothing to do with Aquinas, the Church now teaches that original sin deprives humankind of sanctifying grace. These points may well be connected ("righteousness" sounds like something that belongs to an individual person, and sanctifying grace is a personal gratuity) but it would take a theologian to sort them out.

[4] Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin (Ia IIae, qq. 71-89)," in Stephen J. Pope, editor, *The Ethics of Aquinas*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p.158.

[5] II *Sent*. d. 20, q. 2, a. 3; IV *SCG*, c. 52; *De Malo*, q. 4 & 5; *ST* I, q. 95, a. 1, q. 100, a. 1; *ST* I-II, q. 82, a. 3; *Expositio in Epist. ad Roman*, c. 5, lect. 3.

[6] See, for example, Aquinas *ST* I-II, q. 82, a. 3: *Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia. et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.*

[7] I am grateful to Jay Schleusener for pressing me on this point.

[8] Anselm Winfried Müller calls this kind of view "the new dualism." See Müller, The Concept of a Person in Bioethics," in *Philosophy and Medicine*, 2011, Vol. 111, Pt. I: 85-100.
[9] Boyle, "Additive Theories of Rationality: A critique," September 2011 manuscript, pp. 6-7. An earlier draft of the manuscript circulated under the title "Tack-On Theories of Rationality."
[10] Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, (Routledge: London, 1993), pp. 59-63.
[11] It is not clear that any account of movement or change involving middle-sized physical objects can dispense with tendencies altogether, even if we recognize different tendencies than Aristotle did
[12] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, (Open Court: Chicago, IL 1999), p. 55.
[13] See Aquinas, *ST* II-II qq. 47-56.
[14] See Aquinas, *ST* II-II qq. 57-122.
[15] See Aquinas, *ST* II-II qq. 123-140.
[16] See Aquinas, *ST* II-II qq. 141-170.
[17] Michael Pakaluk, "Structure and Method in Aquinas's Appropriation of Aristotelian Ethical Theory," in Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, editors, *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 39.
[18] As in scholarship on Aristotle's treatments of justice, scholarship on Aquinas's attempts to develop Aristotle's work on justice is deeply divided and controversial. For a good survey of the relevant fields of dispute, see Jeffrey Hause, "Aquinas on Aristotelian Justice: Defender, destroyer, subverter, or surveyor?" in Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, editors, *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 146-164.
[19] Jean Porter, "The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 58-122)" in Stephen Pope, editor, *The Ethics of Aquinas*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 272.
[20] For detailed discussion of Aquinas's reading of Aristotle, see, for example, T. H. Irwin, "Historical Accuracy in Aquinas's Commentary on the Ethics," in Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, editors, *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 13-32.
[21] For an excellent historical discussion of the detail of Aquinas's categorization of the virtues in terms of their objects, their sources, and their ends, see William C. Mattison III, "Thomas's Categorizations of Virtue: Historical background and contemporary significance," *The Thomist* 74 (2010): 189-235.

[22] For a good summary of the controversies surrounding discussions of the relation between infused and acquired virtue in Aquinas, see Angela McKay Knobel, "Two Theories of Christian Virtue," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 84/3 (2010): 599-618. See Michael S. Sherwin, OP, "Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice" for a defense of the claim that Aquinas is importantly committed to the view that there must be infused counterparts to acquired cardinal virtues.
[23] See, for example, Paula Gottlieb, "Are the Virtues Remedial?" in *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (2001) **35:** 342-354 and *The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 52-72.
[24] *ST* I, q. 95, a. 3.
[25] Aquinas writes (*ST* I, q. 95, a. 3): *Virtutes autem nihil aluid sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponunter secundum regulam rationis;*
Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason.
[26] See, for example, T. H. Irwin, "Practical Reason Divided," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, editors, *Ethics and Practical Reason,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 189-214.
[27] See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, *The Importance of What We Care About*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
[28] See, e.g., Bernard Williams, "Integrity," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, editors, *Utilitarianism: For and Against*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973): 108-117.
[29] See, e.g., John Haugeland, "Truth and Rule-Following," in *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998): 305-362.
[30] See, e.g., Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," in *Moral Luck*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 20-39.
[31] See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).