



THE
JUBILEE CENTRE
FOR CHARACTER & VIRTUES

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

Sustaining Character: the role of emotions in enabling character traits to persist

Charles Starkey

This is an unpublished conference paper for the 4th Annual Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues conference at Oriel College, Oxford University, Thursday 7th – Saturday 9th January 2016. These papers are works in progress and should not be cited without author's prior permission.



**SUSTAINING CHARACTER:
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN ENABLING CHARACTER TRAITS TO PERSIST**

**Charles Starkey
Clemson University**

SUSTAINING CHARACTER:

THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN ENABLING CHARACTER TRAITS TO PERSIST

I. Introduction

Much has been said about the issue of the development of character traits, and virtues in particular. But character traits aren't something that we acquire and permanently possess; character is something that must be continually sustained. Here I will argue that emotions are essential to the persistence of character traits because by virtue of their role in preventing "axiological entropy" – the diminishment over time of the sense of the importance of values on which character traits are based. Without emotions the significance of values related to those emotions would fade and the character traits that involve those values would diminish.¹

This paper will outline the nature and function of axiological entropy, providing evidence that emotions prevent such axiological entropy and, in doing so, serve to sustain character traits. Following this it will consider several possible objections to these claims about emotion and character.

II. Character And Axiological Entropy

This role of emotion in sustaining character traits is based on a reasonably uncontroversial assertion that I will only briefly outline here, namely that character traits are dispositions to a range of attitudes and actions that instantiate certain values. A person's

¹ I won't address the demonstrated relation between emotion and motivation here. The interaction between the two is complex but uncontroversial. See Cunningham, Steinberg, and Grev (1980).

attitudes and choices are typically determined, when there is a plurality of possibilities, by the level of importance they attach to the various choices they perceive, that is, their values, and the decisions they make between competing interests are indicative of their character traits. Choosing to help a friend in need rather than enjoying one's leisure time is indicative of one sort of trait. Character traits are thus dependent on our values when we evaluate and choose. A generous person is someone who is disposed to a range of actions that instantiate the value of giving to others without the expectation of receiving something in return, and an honest person someone who is disposed to a range of actions that instantiate the value of truth. Traits of character are thus different from other traits such as habits in that traits of character necessarily involve our values in a way that other traits do not. Performing a task slowly and methodically because it is a habit differs from performing the task in the same way because one is a fastidious person: in the latter case, it is done out of a particular value.

This connection between character traits and values is supported by two observations. First, it explains the disposition to behave in particular sorts of ways in situations where certain values are involved: one has motivating reasons to act because the situation involves what one believes is important. Secondly, holding that the reasons are based on a sense of what is important (that is, reasons based upon certain values that are held to be important) explains why we believe that character traits are tied to what kind of person the person *is*. Insofar as people are judged by their values, and character traits are based on their values, it is natural that character traits are then indicative of what kind of person they are.

Axiological Entropy

Emotions are necessary to the sustenance of character traits because emotions prevent

“axiological entropy” – the diminution over time of the tacit sense of the importance of values on which character traits are based. Without the ongoing reinforcement of emotions, we would not be able to preserve the sense of the importance of values. Once again, the decisions we make between competing interests are indicative of our character traits. Such decisions, in turn, are determined by our values. Honesty involves in large part the value of truth outweighing the value of personal benefit: an honest person values truth more than personal benefit. In the absence of relevant emotions, a value such as accurate representation (truth) would cease to be important to a person, and would thus be unable to drive the person’s perceptions, choices, and actions. They would be less likely to choose and act for the sake of truth, and the corresponding character trait of honesty would be diminished and, over time, extinguished.

There are several lines of support for the phenomenon of axiological entropy and its effect on character traits. One stems from reflection on the relation between emotion and belief. In a discussion of the Stoic view of emotion, Martha Nussbaum refers to the “freshness” of propositions (what I will call “beliefs” in this discussion) that are given a significance by an emotional state. Her central example is grief at the death of a loved one. The fact of the death – the belief that the loved one is dead – is very significant and at the forefront of our mind when we feel grief. The emotion subsides as time passes and with it the level of significance of the death relative to other things, that is, other beliefs that are in our mind. She explains this diminution of emotional force as the fading of the freshness of the belief. Over time the belief regarding the death loses “its extreme sharpness, its intrusive cutting edge” and in relation to other beliefs “It does not assault the other[s]...it sits alongside of them” (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 382). The belief no longer dominates other beliefs that are in our mind. The same can be said of other emotionally laden thoughts. The pride we feel at winning an award places the fact of the

award in the forefront of our mind, but over time the fact of the accomplishment diminishes in significance and it no longer occupies the same place in our mind. The larger point is that we not only have various beliefs, but these beliefs have a certain level of significance to us and this level is variable.

Nussbaum's discussion provides a vehicle for understanding axiological entropy. There is reason to believe that this emotional highlighting and diminution captured by the idea of freshness and fading can occur with the values on which our character traits are based. The particular occurrence of an emotion can enable the specific object of the emotion to have an adequate significance to us, but can also support the significance of broader values. For instance, feeling pride about a particular accomplishment may give us an adequate sense of the importance of our accomplishment, but the emotion can also more generally support our sense of the importance of accomplishments, so that we are likely to have a similar sense of the value of accomplishment in the future. Conversely, their importance relative to the many other concepts and values that we deal with will lessen in time - they will lose their freshness. Were we to go through years without feeling pride or satisfaction in our accomplishments, we would not attach this significance to possible accomplishments. In this way, the sense of the significance of particular types of values, in other words their importance to us, will diminish over time.²

Conditioning

This characterization of axiological entropy is supported by conditioning theory. Both

² Nussbaum notes that the ancient philosopher Chrysippus holds that in order to form passions, judgments must be "fresh," and that "the point of this seems to be to allow for certain sorts of affective distancing, especially over time, compatibly with the retention of the same belief or judgment." This is similar to my claim that concepts and values lose their force, except that I hold that a belief or judgment with a different level of significance is not entirely the same belief. See Nussbaum (1994), p. 381.

the pairing of emotional responses and values and the concept of the flux in the significance of values corresponds with the principles of classical and operant conditioning, particularly the concept of the extinction of learned responses. I'll review these two types of conditioning before discussing extinction and their relation to axiological entropy.

The attraction (and aversion) to values can involve classical conditioning – the pairing of a neutral stimulus with an unconditioned response to transform the neutral stimulus into a conditioned stimulus. A noted example of this is that of Albert, a boy who at nine months was exposed to a white rat. He initially displayed no fear of the rat, but in repeated exposures the presence of the rat was paired with a metal pipe hit with a hammer, a jarring sound that scared the boy and made him cry. After repeated pairings Albert would cry when exposed to the rat without the noise. The unconditioned stimulus (the harsh noise) brought on the unconditioned response (fear), and as a result of conditioning the rat was transformed from a neutral to a conditioned stimulus, which was accompanied by the conditioned response of fear of the white rat (Watson & Rayner, 1920). Discussions of studies like this focus on the production of an emotional reaction, but it is also the case that the rat became an aversive stimulus, one that provided motivation for avoidance. In addition, such studies involve conditioning with specific objects, but as I'll discuss below after reviewing operant conditioning, this conditioning can include broader properties, including general values.

Such aversion and attraction can also result from operant conditioning. Operant conditioning involves voluntary behavior that is rewarded with incentives or punished with disincentives (Skinner 1948). Behaviors or behavioral dispositions are developed or diminished through such reinforcement or punishment. Here rewards and punishments are understood broadly, so someone can be punished for cutting in line by facial expressions, gestures, and

verbal condemnation rather than a formal penalty, and they can be rewarded in similar ways. Operant conditioning comes out of the behaviorist tradition, but it need not be limited to the conditioning of observable behavior in considering its role here. People display “reactive attitudes” of gratitude and anger in response to the perceived affection and good will or contempt and malevolence of others (Strawson, 1974). In this way, reactive attitudes can reinforce or deter certain attitudes and intentions. Praising someone’s telling the truth for the sake of being honest can reinforce that intention, as can the positive feelings within that person that can result from thinking of their intentions as good intentions that are approved by others. The same can be the case with negative feedback directed at bad intentions. Thus, through this sort of conditioning people can be encouraged not only to act in certain ways but with certain motives and intentions. This is relevant to character because acts of a certain character involve specific intentions: acting to help someone for the sake of that person’s good is generous, but acting to help someone because of anticipated benefits for oneself is not generous.

The features of classical and operant conditioning shed light on axiological entropy because conditioning creates attractions and aversions to not only the specific object involved in the conditioning process, but through *stimulus generalization* to more general properties possessed by that object, and these properties can include values. Stimulus generalization supports the relation between Nussbaum’s concept of freshness and general values proposed above. This phenomenon was observed in the Albert study. After the fear conditioning toward the white rat, Albert became fearful of a variety of other white objects as well as the rat. An aversion had been created toward the broader property of “white”. Stimulus generalization can occur in cases where the objects have minimal physical similarity; here the objects share the same stimulus concept, though little in the way of physical features (Martin & Pear, 2010). In

this way, two instances of generosity can share the same conceptual features of a generous act but otherwise different characteristics, and a positive emotional response to an episode of generosity can inform the evaluation of not only the specific instance of generosity, but also the broader property of generosity, and thus affect a broader range of decisions where generosity is at stake.

Thus, these two types of conditioning constitute two different mechanisms through which emotional conditioning can affect the level of importance of values. The associated phenomenon of extinction, which will be considered next, counters conditioning and provides a theoretical grounding for the operation of axiological entropy.

Extinction

The converse of conditioning is extinction. In a way resembling Nussbaum's description of the fading of the force of beliefs over time, the repeated presence of a conditioned stimulus in the absence of an unconditioned stimulus will decrease the occurrence of the conditioned response. This is a feature of emotional as well as behavioral responses. Affective responses to stimuli diminish over time, as studies on the "fading effect" have shown (Holmes, 1970; Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). This can also include our sense of the importance of general concepts or values upon which our character traits are based. Over time, their importance relative to the many other concepts and values that we deal with will lessen – they will lose the freshness that Nussbaum refers to. Thus, the import and value of particular classes of goods can be lost.

The implication of this is that in an environment of competing possible observations, situations that involve values that have diminished will not only be less noticeable, but will not

have the same weight when standing against competing values that they have had before the diminution. If the value of accomplishment diminishes, we will not value particular accomplishments as much and will be less likely to notice and care about situations where accomplishment is at issue. This is not to deny that judgments could be made in such cases. However, we would not be as likely to recognize an accomplishment were the value of accomplishment to lose its freshness, and such a value or the judgments that relate to it would have little significance. Similarly, in the absence of reinforcement the value of honesty would diminish and eventually cease to be of particular significance to a person, and would thus be unable to drive the person's perceptions, choices, and actions. They would be less likely to perceive instances of honesty or dishonesty as such, and would be less likely to choose and act for the sake of truth. The corresponding character trait of honesty would be diminished or extinguished. This diminution of the sense of importance of general values, if unchecked, will degrade both our ability to see various things that should be made salient because they involve those values, and the ability of our practical reason to function properly.³ In this way, without periodically having the relevant emotions, the significance or weights attached to particular values would fade and the character traits that involve those values would cease to be.

Support for this conception of the relation between emotion and value comes from research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One manifestation of PTSD is the phenomenon of emotional numbing, including feelings of detachment and a reduced range of affect (Shay, 1994). Such emotional numbing is associated with callousness and antisocial behavior (Keurig & Becker, 2010; Allwood, Bell, & Horan, 2011). This broad emotional numbing is consistent with the display of anger and thus some emotional responses may be

³ Ronald de Sousa discusses the determination of the significance of various facts in practical reasoning and its relation to the "frame problem" in artificial intelligence. See de Sousa (1987).

numbed while others are still operative, but the numbing that exists is closely associated with maladaptive behavior. This indicates that without the support of emotions, the values that underlie character traits lose their force.⁴

III. Sustaining Character: Preventing Axiological Entropy

In the proper amount the diminution of the importance of particular objects is a good thing. If the pride of winning a grade school spelling contest filled our mind and caused us to gloat in the recollection of the accomplishment a decade later, we would be distracted from our present work and from many other things that are, at this later place and time, much more important. Similarly, mourning over a friend should subside over time to enable one to deal with our other concerns, though the death of the friend is still a tragic loss.

However if unchecked this diminution will, once again, affect the importance of things to us that should remain valuable, particularly certain types of things, including the values associated with character traits. Though much of the discussion of psychological conditioning centers on *creating* associative links and responses, the same principles apply to *maintaining* such responses, that is, keeping existing responses from fading. What prevents this axiological entropy associated with extinction from occurring is the successive emotional pairing with a value – the having of emotions that are directed at objects that involve these values, and serve to maintain or strengthen our sense of their importance. Here the having of relevant emotions from

⁴ There is reason to believe that this fading of the level of importance of values can take place at a larger cultural level as well as an individual level. The decline of honor culture in the West (Bowman, 2007; Wyatt-Brown, 1982) illustrates this. Over the past century honor has become less important in Western culture, and this can be explained as a decreasing emotional resonance that issues involving traditional concepts of honor have. Thus axiological entropy can affect larger cultural values.

time to time reinforces or refreshes general values through stimulus generalization. To return to examples above, associating negative emotional arousal with an instance of harm gives the broader concept of harm a greater weight than it would otherwise, and it informs our evaluation of situations where harm or the risk of harm is at issue. In the same way, the association of negative emotion with episodes of dishonesty gives the value of truth a particular significance, including in decisions where truth is at stake.

This emotional pairing can take several forms. An emotional reaction to a perceived value can produce the pairing of emotion and value in a way that reflects classical conditioning. We may see someone behaving callously to another person, which arouses indignance on our part directed at the callous act and reinforces within us the sense of the significance of callousness and sustains the aversion to callous acts. In addition, the expression of emotion by people can elicit similar feelings in others directed at that object – what Bernard Rimé describes as “emotional communion.” He notes that “The shared episode and the expression of associated emotions by a member of the social group have the power to vividly elicit analogous feelings in people around them, so that a reciprocal stimulation of emotion follows” (Rimé, 2013, p. 95).

In addition, observing reactive attitudes of others toward what we do functions in a similar way. This is different from emotional communion because here the reinforcing emotion within us is not the same as the emotional reaction of other people. For instance, negative reactive attitudes (anger and resentment) in response to a rude act on our part can elicit shame in us and, in line with classical conditioning, produce an emotional association with the act so that the thought of that type of act itself is aversive. And in line with operant conditioning, this can also produce an association with the negative *consequence* of the act that deters us from acting in that way. For instance, when we behave rudely and feel shame after observing the anger of other

people toward the behavior, the shame that is induced marks the consequences of rudeness (the condemnation of others) with a negative association. Positive reactions to behavior, such as gratitude, operate in the same way, but produce positive associations with the type of act and its consequences.

Another device is the experience of art and literature where emotional reactions are encouraged through contextual devices – music, lighting, the appearance of the people involved, etc. All of these serve to prompt and support particular emotional responses directed at objects with particular values. In the film *The Sweet Smell of Success* the dark, atmospheric camerawork and Burt Lancaster's icy vocal delivery, as the semi-fictional columnist J. J. Hunsecker, work together to heighten our chilly disdain at the megalomania that is at the core of Hunsecker's character. More generally, art and literature are valuable because of their ability to induce emotions and pair them with values.⁵

Support for this role of emotions in preventing axiological entropy comes from studies of clinical psychopaths, which show that they display both a lack of emotion to adverse events and diminished ability to empathize (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 1997; Blair, Jones, & Clark, 2001; Kiehl et al. 2001). Along with this emotional deficit they lack, as Patricia Greenspan notes, “the normal measure of receptivity to moral reasons – the capacity to appreciate their force as moral reasons, which involves the capacity for a certain kind of immediate emotional response” (Greenspan, 2003, p. 420). Note that what appears to be present in such psychopathology is the diminished or missing *capacity* for certain emotional responses, not merely the absence of emotional response in many specific situations where such a response would be appropriate. Greenspan's reference to appreciating the force of moral reasons is

⁵ See for instance Ronald de Sousa's discussion of the reinforcement of “paradigm scenarios” provided by art and literature (de Sousa, 1987).

telling: though her focus is on deficits in emotional response to moral norms, the point applies to character traits as well. It follows from this model that people with an impaired capacity for emotional response will have an impaired moral character because emotions do not function normally to prevent axiological entropy, and this research on psychopaths is not only consistent with this but provides support for the model by their diminished appreciation of moral concepts which appear to stem from the diminished emotional capacity rather than vice-versa.⁶ Moreover, impulsivity, a hallmark feature of psychopathy, can be explained by the weak set of values that would keep impulses in check.

Thus, emotional association with values counters axiological entropy and maintains or enhances the importance that these values have for us. Such values include the general values that character traits are based on. A consequence of the above is that the maintenance of beneficial character traits takes place at both an individual and cultural level. Part of character improvement involves recognizing and fostering cultural forces that support the values that underlie character traits. As the above discussion suggests, this can involve and eliciting appropriate emotions in ourselves and others and the social sharing of emotions in the form of emotional communion. These are not sufficient for the possession of beneficial character traits, as it also requires the ability to discern when and how these values apply to particular situations. This ability can be provided in part by the role of emotions in regulating our perception that has been discussed. It also requires practical wisdom in adjudicating between different values, such as when compassion and justice conflict. But though the proper emotional repertoire is not

⁶ People with localized damage to brain regions associated with emotions tend to not have the same response to moral scenarios that involve what are typically emotion-inducing events, though their cognitive functioning appears to be normal. See Koenigs et al. (2007). In addition, the perceptual effects of emotion discussed earlier result from the emotional state rather than prior to the emotional state, and these can affect the significance of such scenarios for the perceiver.

sufficient here, it is necessary for possession of these traits.

IV. Objections

One objection is that responsiveness to values is innate, so that emotional reinforcement is not needed for such values to be significant, and thus is not a requirement for the possession of character traits. One study concludes that three-month-old infants show an aversion to antisocial actors (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). Another study concludes that six-to-ten-month-olds have a strong preference for prosocial (nice) actors over antisocial (mean) actors (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Other research provides evidence that children develop a sense of fairness in distribution of resources between twelve and fifteen months (Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013). However, these findings are consistent with emotions playing the fundamental role outlined above. The first two studies are consistent with rudimentary emotion systems marking prosocial and antisocial behavior, and thus consistent with the capacity for emotional response being required for the preference for prosocial actors. Similarly, the findings of the last study are consistent with the necessity of emotional responses to care about fairness in distribution. This possibility is underscored by Paul Bloom, who notes that “What we see in these emerging emotions [in infants] is the development of mattering.” (Bloom, 2011, p. 78).

A second objection is that because we can obviously *act* when we are not in an emotional state, we can have character traits without emotion. One can help a friend, arrive at a meeting on time, and perform many other tasks indicative of a certain character without being emotionally aroused, so emotions are not necessary for possessing character traits. This objection is unsuccessful because we perceive and understand the objects and situations around us in terms of

various goods, bad and interests, and our perception and motivation is driven by these evaluations. Most long and short range planning is based on values, not simple pains and pleasures. Hunger by itself is a pain, but it is not evaluative; it is not concern or frustration about our hunger. Thus, action that is prompted by hunger or other simple pleasure or pain does not instantiate a character trait: character traits involve acts that instantiate values and broad patterns of perception, cognition and action that are dependent on emotions for reasons given above.

Moreover, our ability to act without emotion can be explained by conditioning, which can affect evaluations and choices even when there is no occurrent emotional state.⁷ Richard Brandt offers an instructive account of unemotional motivation in character traits that illustrates the way in which emotions affect our dispositions in unemotional instances. He believes that we are motivated to avoid acting dishonestly for the same reasons we are averse to drinking castor oil, even when there is no feeling present. Brandt argues that the most plausible explanation of both of these aversions is that their representation “has become motivating as a result of conditioning by prior pleasant or unpleasant (or other) experiences.... So there is a proliferation of aversions – a result of conditioning by association – supported by praise or blame, and by identifications” (Brandt, p. 72). On this account, unemotional desires and aversions are the product of associations with affectively arousing experiences. Brandt is speaking specifically of the motivational power of unemotional representations, but the same point can also be made about the significance of the representations to the perceiver. The association of affective arousal with a general value (such as honesty) gives it a certain significance that is independent of individual instances of emotional arousal, and this association disposes us to choices which reflect this

⁷ One way of explaining this is the somatic marker hypothesis put forward by Antonio Damasio. According to this hypothesis, subtle bodily responses to stimuli and the brains representation of such responses even in the absence of such responses serve to bias deliberation in line with the responses (Damasio, 1998).

significance. Such a mechanism is supported by conditioning theory as discussed above: the conditioned response can be an unemotional aversion that is, at some time prior, created by an the emotional response.

Moreover, even if emotions were not necessary for some occasional acts that arise from values, they would still be necessary for character traits because such traits are based on ongoing dispositions that would be unlikely to exist in the total absence of emotions.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, by maintaining the importance of our various values, emotions play a critical role in the possession of character traits. The consequences of this, as outlined above, is that sustaining character must involve an appropriate emotional repertoire that supports character-relevant values on both an individual and cultural level through eliciting emotions within ourselves and in others.

Two concluding observations are in order. First, one might take the position that emotions determine the ends of our actions: we decide and act for the sake of what we are emotional drawn to and against what we are emotionally repelled by.⁸ The account proposed here is both narrower and more complex: emotions set parameters on our deliberation and actions in the service of our ends, whatever the source of our ends may be. By influencing both our perception and deliberation, these emotions limit what we conceive of doing and what we eventually do. We could want very much to sell our house and strive to sell it, but answer questions about its condition accurately because of the importance of honesty to us. In this way

⁸ See for instance de Sousa (2004).

emotions direct the process of deliberation itself, which is importantly distinct from setting the ultimate ends of deliberation.

Second, the arguments above do not imply that emotions determine character traits in any simple way. We may have excessive emotional reactions that, if taken as infallible indicators of the importance of their object, would deliver a very inaccurate sense of such importance. But emotionally driven perceptions and action tendencies can be moderated by a wider range of experience or reflective consideration, so that we may not follow the promptings of a particular emotion. Just as one may be disposed to be afraid of dogs and, knowing that this is the case, temper their sense of the actual danger that dogs pose, one may be emotionally aroused by a value such as loyalty and place a premium on it, but may also be reflectively aware of this and temper the motivational salience of loyalty with a broader range of knowledge and experience. Beliefs about the significance of loyalty here do not simply correspond with the degree of one's emotional response to situations where loyalty is at issue. More broadly, emotional responses do not rigidly determine the level of importance of values. Nevertheless, emotions are the groundwork for this sense of importance as well as for the perceptual dispositions that underlie character traits.⁹

⁹ The support of The Character Project at Wake Forest University and the John Templeton Foundation have made the development of this paper possible as part of a larger research project.

REFERENCES

- Allwood, M. A., Bell, D. J., & Horan, J. (2011). Posttrauma numbing of fear, detachment, and arousal predict delinquent behaviors in early adolescence. *Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 40*(5), 659-8.
- Blair, R. J., Colledge, E., Murray, L., & Mitchell, D. G. (2001). A selective impairment in the processing of sad and fearful expressions in children with psychopathic tendencies. *Journal of Abnormal and Child Psychology, 29*(6), 491-7.
- Blair, R., Jones, L., & Clark, F. (1997). *The psychopathic individual: A lack of responsiveness to distress cues?*. *Psychophysiology, 34*(2), 192-6.
- Bloom, P. (2011). Moral nativism and moral psychology. In M. Mikulincer, & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (pp. 71-18). Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
- Bowman, J. (2007). *Honor: A history*. New York: Encounter.
- Brandt, R. B. (1988). The structure of virtue. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 13*(1), 64-18.
- Cunningham, M. R., Steinberg, J., & Grev, R. (1980). Wanting to and having to help: Separate motivations for positive mood and guilt-induced helping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38*(2), 181-11.
- Damasio, A. (1998). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex. In Roberts, Angela C. Robbins, Trevor W., & L. Weiskrantz (Eds.), *The prefrontal cortex: Executive and cognitive function* (pp. 36-50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- de Sousa, R. (1987). *The rationality of emotion*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- de Sousa, R. (2004). Emotions: What I know, what I'd like to think I know, and what I'd like to think. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions* (pp. 61-74). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flanagan, O. J. (1991). *Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Greenspan, P. (2003). Responsible psychopaths. *Philosophical Psychology, 16*(3), 417-12.
- Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2007). Social evaluation by preverbal infants. *Nature, 450*(7169), 557-3.
- Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2010). Three-month-olds show a negativity bias in their social evaluations. *Developmental Science, 13*(6), 923-6.
- Holmes, D. S. (1970). Differential change in affective intensity and the forgetting of unpleasant personal experiences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15*(3), 234-5.
- Kiehl, K. A., Smith, A. M., Hare, R. D., Mendrek, A., Forster, B. B., Brink, J., et al. (2001). Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal psychopaths as revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. *Biological Psychiatry, 50*(9), 677-7.
- Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. *Nature, 446*(7138), 908-3.
- Le Doux, J. (1996). *The emotional brain*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Martin, G., & Pear, J. (2010). *Behavior modification*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
- Nussbaum, M. (1994). The stoics on the extirpation of the passions. In M. Nussbaum (Ed.), *The therapy of desire* (pp. 359-42). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Rimé, B. (2013). Can socially sharing emotions change emotions?. In D. Hermans, B. Rimé & B. Mesquita (Eds.), *Changing emotions* (pp. 91-5). New York: Psychology Press.
- Shay, J. (1994). *Achilles in vietnam: Combat trauma and the undoing of character*. New York: Atheneum.
- Skinner, B. F. (1948). 'Superstition' in the pigeon. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 38(2), 168-4.
- Sommerville, J. A., Schmidt, M. F. H., Yun, J., & Burns, M. P. (2013). The development of fairness expectations and prosocial behavior in the second year of life. *Infancy*, 18(1), 40-26.
- Strawson, P. F. (1974). *Freedom and resentment and other essays*. London: Methuen.
- von Wright, G. H. (1963). *The varieties of goodness*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Walker, W. R., Vogl, R. J., & Thompson, C. P. (1997). Autobiographical memory: Unpleasantness fades faster than pleasantness over time. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 11(5), 399-14.
- Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 3(3), 1-13.
- Wyatt-Brown, B. (1982). *Southern honor: Ethics and behavior in the old south*. New York: Oxford University Press.