Courage in Public Debate: Process Courage, Accolade Courage, and Values

Charles Starkey, Cynthia Pury and Laura Olson

Courage in Public Debate:
Process Courage, Accolade Courage, and Values

Dr. Charles Starkey, Department of Philosophy, Clemson University
Dr. Cynthia Pury, Department of Psychology, Clemson University
Dr. Laura Olson, Department of Political Science, Clemson University

I. Introduction

Courage has long been regarded as one of the central virtues. One reason for this is its role as an "executive virtue," that is, a virtue that makes other virtues possible by enabling people to act for the good in the face of reasons to do otherwise (Pears 1978; Roberts 1984). However, others have noted that as important as courage is, it can be dangerous, because it creates conditions for its own practice, and encourages people to take risks that are unjustified by the true value of the goal being pursued (Rorty 1988). This ambivalence extends to the designation of people and actions as courageous. Actions that some people consider courageous are denounced by others as worthless or despicable.

This raises questions about what courage is and what should and should not be designated as courageous. Here we argue that the term courage serves two functions and involves two different concepts. One, *process courage*, is the use of the term to describe a process, perhaps *the* process, by which people act in the face of risk for compelling reasons. The other, *accolade courage*, is a form of societal acknowledgment - the use of the term to commend and draw attention to the action or the person that acts. We will consider various sorts of empirical support for this distinction, including a recent study

that we conducted, and conclude by outlining the importance of this distinction for public debates about courage.

Much of the support for the process / accolade distinction will come from psychology. We note that despite the importance of courage as an executive virtue, there has been little work in psychology devoted to the topic. In a recent search of the PsychINFO indexing database, "courage" and the related constructs "bravery" and "heroism" are key words for 128 peer-reviewed entries since the 1800s, while "fear", "anxiety" and "avoidance" are key words for 45,446 peer-reviewed entries in the same period. In addition, the existing psychological work reveals a variety of conceptions of courage, most of which are adopted without any systematic consideration of why courage should be defined that way (or any other way), and some of these are clearly inadequate. For example, Norton and Weiss (2009) define courage as "behavioral approach in the face of a fear-eliciting situation," but this crucially ignores the significance of the goal, which arguably distinguishes courage from garden-variety reckless behavior. This indicates that both psychological work and conceptual philosophical work should be brought to bear in examining and analyzing courage.

II. Process Courage

Work in both philosophy and psychology have focused on process courage. A representative contemporary proposal is that of James Wallace, who claims that "An action is courageous when someone believes it is dangerous to act, is worth the risk it involves, it is possible for them to do it, and, lastly, that the danger they see is formidable enough that most people would find it difficult to do" (Wallace 1978). This model of

courage appears plausible; a compelling illustration of it is found in the case of Monica Lin Brown, an army medic who was recently awarded the Silver Star (the nation's third highest medal for valor). When in April 2007 a convoy was struck by a roadside bomb in Afghanistan, Brown ran through insurgent gunfire and used her body to shield wounded soldiers while mortar rounds fell, rather than taking cover herself, and moved them so that they could be given initial treatment and evacuated. In doing so she saved the lives of the soldiers. Brown believed that it was dangerous to act, but that doing so was both possible and worth the risk, and that the level of danger was serious enough that most people would probably find it difficult to do. Wallace's criteria appear to articulate the central features of the act that make it courageous, and we believe that these features have broad appeal with one exception. Though Wallace's identification of the properties of courageous acts seems largely correct, we believe that the condition that most people would find it difficult is questionable. Consider the following account of a child dealing with her learning disability related in Pury, Kowalski, and Spearman (2007).

> …[M]y nine-year-old had cried her heart out, saying over and over that she didn't want to go to school because they were being given a big Social Studies test that day. She was afraid her learning disabilities would get in the way, and she wouldn't even be able to read the questions, much less know the answers. Her fears grew and grew until they made her physically ill. It took me more than an hour to convince her to get dressed. …. When we arrived at school, she begged me not to make her go inside: "I just can't do it, Momma. I can't take that test." I was afraid I was going to

have to physically drag her from the car when suddenly she wiped her tears, got out, and walked with me to the door. I marveled at her bravery …. Will anyone ever understand how much courage it takes for my little girl to face a simple test? (Abbott, 2006, p. 2)

This story is revealing, because the girl is arguably acting courageously, but is not performing an act that most other people would find difficult. This suggests that acts can be courageous in the event that they are difficult for most people to accomplish, but also in the event that the acts are difficult for the actor, with their specific background, to accomplish.

What Wallace provides us with is largely a description of process courage. To call an act courageous is to describe the psychological event of willfully acting in the face of risk for something deemed to be worth the risk. Among the limited psychological literature there is an absence of consensus regarding the essential components of courage (Lopez 2003; Rate 2007; Rachman 1990; Peterson & Seligman 2004). Christopher Rate (2010) has a view similar to Wallace's, according to which courage consists of voluntary action taken despite personal risk for a worthwhile goal, but regardless of theoretical differences among psychological theories they, like Wallace, focus on the psychological processes that underlie courageous behavior.

Process courage is also a prominent component in psychotherapy, a practice that aims to change behavior by understanding and altering the process by which people experience and interact with themselves and the world. Psychotherapeutic treatments involve taking action that includes a subjective sense of risk (and the objective chance of

having an unpleasant panic attack) in pursuit of increased mental health, the prototypical case of psychological courage (Putman, 2004). Analytic theorists (e.g., Bacha, 2001; Gans, 2005) describe courage as a helpful and possibly necessary part of engaging in the psychotherapeutic process, because it requires psychological courage to face unpleasant facts in the service of emotional recovery. The facing of such facts is essential to this process but often the source of intense fear and anxiety. Bacha (2001) proposed that facing these facts might be a part of therapeutic change, including being willing to examine one's underlying psychological structures, mourning the past and accepting that some possibilities are lost, and moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar. The disclosure and confrontation of pain in psychoanalytic group work, according to Gans (2005), requires courage from patients that should be acknowledged by therapists. Gans also noted that the type of courage he describes is neither universal nor absolute, and that therapists need to learn to become more attuned to patients' courageousness in treatment. Presumably, therapists would not need to increase their awareness of courage that easily fits the courage as accolade model.

III. Accolade Courage

We propose that in many cases, the function of calling a particular action or actor courageous is not merely providing a description, but rather to convey the approval by either an individual or a larger social milieu, and to encourage the behavior involved. We believe that here, courage is chiefly an accolade which is a form of *illocutionary act*. One of the most important contributions of the philosopher J.L. Austin was to bring to light

the fact that language has multiple functions beyond referring to things in the world. Austin (1975) defined illocutionary acts as statements that go beyond simply informing the listener or reader; they are normally uttered with the intent of changing something. For instance, exclaiming "The dog is rabid!" does not merely describe a feature of something in the world but serves to influence people's behavior by encouraging them to avoid the dog. Similarly, by calling an action courageous, the speaker is typically not only describing a feature of the act, but is also praising an action as good, noble, or worthwhile to the end of encouraging such behavior. What lines of evidence are there for this view?

Praise

The hypothesis that labeling something as courageous has the function of an accolade predicts that society will commonly praise courage in a tangible and public way. Indeed, awards for courage are quite common. Frequently, this labeling is quite public: a Lexus-Nexis Academic search of news wire services for "courage" and "award" returned roughly 1000 hits per year for the last several years. Many of these stories are about recipients of some particular award for courage or bravery: the Anne Frank Award for Moral Courage, the Australian Bravery Awards, the Courage to Come Back Award, the Children of Courage Award, the Arthur Ashe Courage Award, the Profile in Courage Award, the Courage in Journalism Award, and a multitude of others appear in the results.

As described above, these awards commonly prescribe a particular level and/or type of risk faced in the course of pursuing, and typically achieving, a particular goal, and in this way are consistent with the criteria for the accolade of courage discussed in the above literature. For example, the Australian Bravery Decorations are awarded to

Australian citizens or individuals whose acts are in the interest of Australia and who "selflessly put themselves in jeopardy to protect the lives or property of others" making a "deliberate choice to go from a place of safety to danger or remain in a perilous position to provide help," (Australian Government, 2008). The Courage in Journalism Award recognizes of female journalists in any country who "exhibit extraordinary strength of character, bravery and perseverance in reporting the news; have a strong commitment to press freedom and [are] well-respected journalists who have shown a commitment to journalism exemplified by a willingness to continually put their life or their freedom at risk to produce a body of work in the face of government oppression, political pressure, physical danger or other intimidating obstacles," (International Women's Media Foundation, 2008). Nominees for the Courage to Come Back Award must reside in northwestern Pennsylvania (U.S.A.) and "have demonstrated extraordinary courage in overcoming illness, injury, chemical dependency or economic adversity"; the award is judged based on "addiction, accident, illness, injury or economic misfortune; recovery process (include[ing] setbacks, outlook, specific accomplishments, and current activity); and [w]ays in which this individual has enhanced the recovery of others either directly or through organizational participation," (Sisters of St. Joseph, n.d.). Each of these awards specifies a particular level of goal or accomplishment (protecting another, reporting the news, enhancing the recovery of others) and a focus on the level of risks the person faced in striving for that goal (putting one's self in danger or remaining in danger, putting one's life or freedom at risk, or the variety of conditions covered by the Courage to Come Back Award). Nomination instructions make it clear that awards are determined based on a clear statement of the magnitude of both the risks and the goals.[1]

Modern statues and monuments that commonly commemorate acts of courage provide another line of evidence. Most of these regard military courage, such as the World War II Memorial in Washington DC, USA and the Tugu Negara in Malyasia, and moral courage, such as the Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery Alabama, USA, and the Nelson Mandela bust in London, UK. The inscriptions attached to these public sculptures are suitably monumental and commonly describe a debt owed to the honorees. One example is the quote by Harry S. Truman inscribed on the WWII Memorial: "Our debt to the heroic men and valiant women in the service of our country can never be repaid. They have earned our undying gratitude." Some describe the specific goals pursued by the honorees: "Dedicated to the heroic fighters in the cause of peace and freedom, May the blessing of Allah be upon them," reads the inscription on the Tugu Negara; and "…until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream," is the quote from Martin Luther King Jr. on the Civil Rights Monument. They frequently also include a description of the risks incurred by the honorees, for instance "Gaoled 5th August 1962, Sentenced to Life Imprisonment 12th June 1964 for His Actions Against Apartheid," which is inscribed on a bust of Nelson Mandela in London. Though rarely commemorated in a monument, psychological or vital courage is at times and when it is the challenge at hand, such as a disability, is prominently featured: a statue of Helen Keller in Cleveland Ohio reads "Here I am not disenfranchised. No barrier of the senses shuts me out." A bronze statue of Franklin D. Roosevelt in a wheelchair at the Roosevelt Memorial in Washington DC (USA) bears an inscription behind from Eleanor Roosevelt reading "Franklin's illness gave him strength and courage he had not had before. He had to think out the fundamentals of living and learn the greatest of all lessons

-- infinite patience and never-ending persistence," thus suggesting that his disability was a wellspring for later greatness. In all of the cases above, the individuals or groups honored with a monument are cultural icons who have overcome extreme risks pursuing and commonly attaining a good that is extremely valuable to society.

Goals and Appreciation of Risk

If calling an action or person courageous is an accolade and not merely a description of the act or the psychological state of the actor, then people should be less willing to call an action courageous if they devalue or disagree with its goals or consider its risks trivial. There is ample anecdotal evidence consistent with this prediction.

Anecdotal evidence is provided by the experience of examining questionnaires about courage. In our lab we have collected nearly 1000 narrative answers to the question "Describe a time in your life when you believe that you acted courageously." The most common answers given by our college student samples include: preventing an injury to someone else in a dangerous environment, such as saving someone from drowning; stepping outside one's comfort zone to try something new, such as attending college far away from home and familiar environments; and standing up to others for what is right, such as risking one's own social reputation to defend the target of teasing or bullying (e.g., Pury et al., 2007; Pury & Kowalski, 2007).[2] Those coding the data encountered narratives that left them with a gut response of "that's not courage!" These incidents normally involved cases in which the ethical choices pursued by the participant were different from those that the coder would make; for example, one participant described breaking up with a serious boyfriend at the request of the boyfriend's mother. The participant never told the boyfriend why she broke up with him to preserve his

9

relationship with his mother. Several coders believed that the courageous choice would have been to stay with him and did not see this action as courageous. Other actions that were questioned as courageous involved those in which the risks were judged too small to warrant the label of courage; for example, a coder who grew up in South Africa was unimpressed by narratives of encounters with vicious dogs. Anything short of a lion or hyena was less than a threat to her as they were unlikely to hunt humans for prey.

Outcome and Accolade

With the accolade function of courage it follows that the act is deemed worthy of praise, and it predicts that actions failing to meet their goal would be less likely to be praised and thus less likely to be considered courageous. Some awards for courage have an explicit requirement that the action was successful. For example, the Courage in Journalism Award requires that awardees "produce a body of work in the face of government oppression, political pressure, physical danger or other intimidating obstacles" (International Women's Media Foundation, 2008).

Other awards specifically state that the intended goal need not be attained, for example the Carnegie Hero Award requires that nominees "save or attempt to save" the life of another (Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, 2009 b). However, in practice the award appears to have been made much more often to those who succeed than to those who fail: inspection of the narratives posted for the 74 acts for which at least one Carnegie Hero Medal was awarded in a sample year (Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, 2009 a) reveals that in 66 cases (89%), all of the victims were rescued. In eight cases (11%), at least one of the victims died during the incident. Moreover, cases of failed or incomplete rescue are significantly associated with the death of the rescuer (Chi-square =

10

19.45, p < .01). Of the cases in which at least one victim died before rescue, 7 incidents (88%) also lead to the death of at least one would-be rescuer, while of the 66 cases of rescue, only 11 (15%) also involved the death of at least one rescuer. There was only one instance of an award being made to rescuers who lived who did not save every victim; in that case, one victim died while the other two were saved. Thus awards were made only in instances of successful rescue or when a would-be rescuer died trying.

The awarding of the Carnegie Hero Medal, or any award for courage, is dependent upon a variety of idiosyncratic factors. It may be that some of these factors make it more likely that successful actions will be honored for these idiosyncratic reasons rather than because successful actions are seen as more heroic. Or, it may be the case that attempted rescues are typically successful, and the high death rate among rescuers in failed attempts merely reflects more extreme (and less worthwhile) risks. What happens in more scientifically controlled situations?

When asked to describe their own courageous action (Pury et al., 2007), participants nearly always describe an action that improved the situation and did not make it worse.   In both cases, to answer the question participants need to select an action that they believe is courageous: even if it is their own behavior, selecting and writing about that action is, in effect, labeling it as courageous. Saying that an action is courageous, then, is more likely for actions that end with success than with failure.

Relevance of Fear

Fear on the part of the actor is a questionable part of courage as an accolade. Rate et al's (2007) data suggests that fear might or might not be required for calling an action courageous, and, indeed, in some of the definitions used in their study the absence of fear

11

was a requirement. It is difficult to imagine a citation for valor including the statement

"She was terrified, but then she got over her fear and jumped into the water to rescue

him." A search of Carnegie Hero Medal data from 2008 (Carnegie Hero Fund

commission, 2009 a) for the words "fear", "afraid", "terrified", and "worried" found that

those words were never used in the description of the 74 courageous actions for which

medals were awarded.

Social / Political Affiliations and Courage Attribution

One significant prediction of this model predicts is that the attribution of courage

to people or actions is affected by their social and political backgrounds and beliefs. In a

recent study we examined the relationships among values, agreement with the goal of an

action, and courage-attribution. We specifically targeted whether and how values

structure attitudes about the courageousness of recent actions by popular figures in the

United States that reflect both pro- and anti-LGBTQ+ principles, and thus whose actions

might differ greatly in perceived goodness among individuals who differ in their support

of traditional (heteronormative) family values. In the study, participants from two

samples were randomly assigned to read about Caitlyn Jenner or Kim Davis. Caitlyn

Jenner, formerly known as William Bruce Jenner and Bruce Jenner, a prominent

American athlete and celebrity who publicly transitioned from male to female. Jenner is

known for winning the men's decathlon at the 1976 Summer Olympics. Multiple

publications have described her as the most famous openly transgender person in the

world since she revealed her gender identification as a trans woman in an April 2015.

Kim Davis is the county clerk of Rowan County in the state of Kentucky in the United

States. In 2015, Davis gained national media attention after defying a federal court order

requiring that she issue marriage licenses following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that there is a right to same-sex marriage guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Supreme Court decision, Davis began refusing to issue any licenses, either to same-sex or opposite-sex couples. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ordered Davis to issue licenses as required by law. Davis continued to defy the court order and deny marriage licenses, and was subsequently jailed for contempt of court, then released five days later. When she returned to work, she stated she would not interfere with her deputies, who had begun issuing licenses according to the court order.

Participants were asked about how much they agreed with what Jenner or Davis was trying to accomplish and how much risk she faced. Participants were also asked about their attitudes towards traditional family values. We hypothesized that reports of the courageousness of the Jenner's and Davis' actions would be most strongly and positively predicted by agreement with the goal of the action, and that that agreement would be predicted by beliefs about traditional family values. As we predicted, traditional family values predicted agreement with the target´s goal, and agreement with goal predicted courage attribution. Those who rated higher on traditional values were more likely to see Kim Davis' actions as courageous, and those who rated lower on traditional values were more likely to see Caitlyn Jenner's actions as courageous.

Both Jenner and Davis were acting for the sake of what they take to be important values. However, whether the actions were considered courageous by other people largely depended on whether the actions were something that they would approve of. In other words, they tend to judge the actions along the lines of the accolade courage model.

If the action was not commendable, they were not seen as courageous. This study

provides support for the distinction between accolade and process courage.

IV. The Importance of the Process / Accolade Distinction

What insights can this model of courage have for the important public discourse

of virtues (and vices)? One debate that recurs is whether objectionable acts qualify as

courageous. One of the best illustrations of this is the case of statements by comedian

and political commentator Bill Maher, shortly after terrorists used hijacked airplanes in

suicide attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Maher commented on his

television show that, contrary to political and media characterizations of the attacks as

cowardly, "Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what you want about it,

it's not cowardly" (Breznican, 2002). Public outcry ensued, with Maher's show rapidly

losing advertisers and eventually being cancelled. Maher clearly did not endorse the

attacks or the behavior of the attackers. What he seemed to be referring to was the

psychological process of the attackers – their ability to carry through with their mission.

Though the attribution at issue in this example is cowardice it involves the same issue as

attributions of courage. People appeared to take Maher's statement as a validation of the

actions of the attackers – something short of an accolade, but related. So, on our theory,

part of what caused this uproar and ensuing debate about issues like this is confusion over

the function of the term – as a commendation or as a description of a psychological

process.

There are other benefits to applying this accolade/process distinction to

discussions of courage. For those of us who perform research on virtues, it sharpens our

understanding of the use of courage attributions. Another benefit is that it can help prevent individuals or groups talking past each other in disputing whether a person or action is courageous (or cowardly), as in the example above. The distinction highlights this kind of confusion and can help move forward public debate over whether certain actions involve courage.

In addition, the distinction underscores that there are individual and cultural differences in exactly what type of acts are considered deserving of public praise. Consider the earlier example of the girl developing resolve to take the social studies test, which given her personal situation was an achievement. Moreover, the degree to which acts are seen as heroic, or extremely high in courage, may vary with changes within a culture. For instance, Barczewski (2007) traces the change in public perception of the heroism of Scott and Shackleton, two contemporary Antarctic explorers from Great Britain. Scott's final expedition and death in Antarctica, seen as the epitome of a "stiff upper lip" mentality and a devotion to a lost cause, was extensively praised during the first part of the 20th century. Shackleton returned from his failed expedition with little fanfare. More recently, however, admiration of Scott's heroism has declined in favor of Shackleton, whose flexibility and optimism saved his entire party.

One might object that a unified conception of courage can be had by stipulating that courage involves the processes discussed above that are directed at what is in fact a wise or worthwhile end. However, because people talk about courage in ways that are distinctly process-oriented (as reflected in the executive virtue conception of courage) and in ways that are distinctly accolade oriented (as reflected in the examples above) this

distinction is important to make because these are part of the discourse of courage. In addition, appeal to a unified conception of what is worthwhile, which one might think can tie the two together, is problematic because of differences in what objectively constitutes thriving and excellence in different cultures, and because of the inherent tensions between personal and social thriving within a particular culture.

In conclusion, the process / accolade distinction is an important tool for both ongoing research on courage, and in our public discourse about courageous acts and courageous people.

References

Arch, J., & Craske, M. (2008). Acceptance and commitment therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders: Different treatments, similar mechanisms? *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice*, *15*, 263-279.

Austin, J.L. (1975). *How to do things with words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Australian Government (2008). *Australian Bravery Decorations*: http://www.itsanhonour.gov.au/honours/awards/medals/bravery.cfm

Bacha, C. (2001). The courage to stay in the moment. *Psychodynamic Counselling*, *7*, 279-295.

Barczewski, S. (2007). *Antarctic destinies: Scott, Shackleton and the changing face of heroism*. London: Continuum Books.

Breznican, A. (2002). Bill Maher to tape final episode of 'Politically Incorrect.' *The Associated Press State and Local Wire*. Retrieved April 11, 2004 from Lexis Nexis database.

Eifert, G., & Forsyth, J. (2005). *Acceptance and commitment therapy for anxiety disorders: A practitioner's treatment guide to using mindfulness, acceptance, and values-based behavior change strategies*. Oakland, CA US: New Harbinger Publications.

Gans, J. (2005). A plea for greater recognition and appreciation of our group members' courage. *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, *55*, 575-593.

Hayes, S., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. (1999). *Acceptance and commitment therapy: An experiential approach to behavior change*. New York, NY

International Women's Media Foundation. *Courage in journalism award nomination form*. International Women's Media Foundation: https://www.iwmf.org/couragenomination.aspx

Lopez, S., O'Byrne, K., & Petersen, S. (2003). Profiling courage. *Positive psychological assessment: A handbook of models and measures* (pp. 185-197). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.

Lord, H. G. (1918). *The psychology of courage*. Boston: John W. Luce.

Norton, P. J., & Weiss, B. J. (2009). The role of courage on behavioral approach in a fear-eliciting situation: A proof-of-concept study. *Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23*, 212-217.

Pears, D. (2003). Aristotle's analysis of courage. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 3, (1978), pp. 273-85.

Peterson, C., & Seligman, M.E.P. (2004). Strengths of courage: Introduction. In C. Peterson & M.E.P. Seligman (Eds.) *Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification.* Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.

Pury, C. L. S., & Kowalski, R. (2007). Human Strengths, Courageous Actions, and General and Personal Courage. *Journal of Positive Psychology, 2*, 120 - 128.

Pury, C. L. S., & Woodard, C. Courage. (2009). In S. J. Lopez, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology, Vol. 1*, 247-254. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Pury, C.L.S., Kowalski, R.M., & Spearman, M.J. (2007). Distinctions between General and Personal Courage. *Journal of Positive Psychology, 2*, 99 – 114.

Putman, D. 2004. *Psychological courage*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Rachman, S. (1990). *Fear and courage (2nd ed.)*. New York, NY, US: W H Freeman/Times Books/ Henry Holt & Co.

Rate, C., Clarke, J., Lindsay, D., & Sternberg, R. (2007). Implicit theories of courage. *The Journal of Positive Psychology*, *2*, 80-98.

Rate, C. R. (2010). Defining the features of courage: A search for meaning. In C. L. S. Pury & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *The psychology of courage: Modern research on an ancient virtue* (pp. 47–66). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Roberts, R. C. (1984). Will power and the virtues. *Philosophical Review*, XCIII, 227-247.

Rorty, A. (1988). Two faces of courage. in A. Rorty (ed.) *Mind in action*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Sisters of St. Joseph(n.d.). *The courage to come back*. http://www.ssjerie.org/Courage.htm

Szagun, G. (1992). Age-related changes in children's understanding of courage. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, *153*, 405-420.

Thaler, R. H. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, 39–60

Wallace, J. (1978). *Virtues and vices.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Woodard, C., & Pury, C. (2007). The construct of courage: Categorization and measurement. *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research*, *59*, 135-147.