Challenges to Professional Integrity

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We begin with a basic problem, effectively articulated some years ago by William F. May. In his "Professional Virtue and Self-Regulation" he expresses concern about our increasing dependence on professionals to provide us with competent, reliable service:[1]

> Few others—whether lay people or other professionals—know what any given expert is up to. [They] had better be virtuous. Few may be in a position to discredit [them]. The knowledge explosion is also an ignorance explosion; if knowledge is power, then ignorance is powerlessness. Although it is possible to devise structures that limit the opportunities for the abuse of specialized knowledge, ultimately one needs to cultivate virtue in those who wield that relatively inaccessible power. One test of character and virtue is what a person does when no one else is watching. A society that rests on expertise needs more people who can pass that test. (May, in Callahan, 1988, p. 408)[2]

May does not tell us specifically what would count as "passing" this test. Presumably there are behavioral criteria, as May wants to know what professionals do. But, since he is interested in what professionals do when no one is watching, he also has some dispositional criteria in mind. Also, it would seem that a key factor is that professionals do not believe that they are being watched. For if they believed that they were being watched, assuming they would not want to be caught engaging in wrongdoing, or at least shoddy behavior, we would expect them to behave in an acceptable manner.

Given that, according to May, so much of what professionals do is, in effect, "unwatched", it would seem that being able to have confidence in their competence and reliability is essential. That is, as May might put it, we would like to be able to

rest assured that professionals possess qualities of character and virtues that render them *trustworthy* even when they are not being watched.

Acquiring the special expertise required for minimal competence as a doctor, lawyer, engineer, or accountant requires dedication and hard work. But, while a necessary part of becoming a trustworthy professional, this is hardly sufficient. Most professions have codes of ethics that express a commitment to serving clients and the public well. The expectation is that members of a profession are to be basically honest and dedicated to exercising their skills well in providing needed services for others. Typically, these codes articulate both rules of conduct and aspirational ideals. Upholding both would seem to require, as May indicates, having certain qualities of character that are dependable even when "no one is watching".

May does not say much about what specific virtues and qualities of character we need in professionals. One might be tempted to approach matters in a "top/down" manner. Start with a general notion of 'integrity', one that includes a broad range of well-integrated virtues that, when applied to professional life, result in a kind of professional integrity. Damien Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael P. Levine describe this approach in this way:

> Integrity is seen as the one virtue—essentially the same virtue expected of one's life partner, a friend, an employee, a priest, a teacher or a politician. Professional integrity then becomes a matter of the extent to which a person displays personal integrity in their professional lives.[3]

They have two basic objections to this way of characterizing professional integrity. First, this depiction lacks sensitivity to the particular roles professionals have as professionals. Different professions require different competencies and involve very different kinds of responsibilities. Thus, they conclude, what constitutes professional integrity in one profession may be quite different from what constitutes professional integrity in other professions.

Second, proceeding from a general concept of personal integrity to the more specific concept of professional integrity, they say, typically invokes a vague notion of being "true to oneself". But what this might mean in a professional context is unclear. Cox, La Caze, and Levine, instead, offer this view:

Professional integrity is not a matter of remaining true to oneself; it is, very roughly, a matter of remaining true to the fundamental role and character of one's profession—to its principles, values, ideals, goals and standards. This requires that professionals not merely remain true to and publicly endorse personal values and principles but that they remain true to the role they are publicly entrusted with.[4]

Thus, discussions of professional integrity need to focus contextually on the particular professions in question (e.g., accountancy, engineering, law, or medicine), taking into account their specific differences.

James Wallace provides us with a good illustration of what Cox, La Caze, and Levine seem to have in mind:[5]

A surgeon performs many different tasks—talking with patients, working with other members of the medical staff, filling out prescriptions, making examinations, attending meetings, reading medical books and magazines, deciding whether to recommend surgery, performing different sorts of surgery (using various instruments at different times), deciding how many patients to accept, and so on. These are not all the same activities even though they might be said to serve the same set of purposes. *A crucial factor that provides unity to this picture is the surgeon's sense of being a surgeon.* (emph. added) These activities are all important to being a surgeon, but they must be done well, not only as individual activities but together as the work of a good surgeon; and this calls for intelligence, sensitivity, skill, and judgment. This lends unity to the diverse set of activities that constitute the surgeon's practice as a surgeon.

This approach still allows significant room for the consideration of character and virtues, but the focus is on how one functions in one's professional role, not more generally as a person in any setting whatever. Even if professional integrity also reflects broader qualities that characterize one's personal integrity as well, it is primarily the former that is receiving attention here.

However, recent discussions of empirical research in moral psychology raise serious questions about the extent to which matters of character and virtue can be

plausibly understood as sufficiently robust and global to come into play even in the ways this more contextual approach might support.[6] What must be taken into account is how much our behavior is a function of quite local "situational" factors—particular kinds of influences, many of which may be underappreciated, or even unnoticed, by professionals themselves.

How professionals are affected by these situational factors needs to be attended to. A strong "situationist" position would place more emphasis on factors outside the individual professional than on supposed internal factors such as character and virtue. Two well known stories in the history of philosophy can help frame the challenges situationist views may pose for professional integrity.

First there is Plato's story of the Ring of Gyges.[7] A shepherd discovers a ring that enables him to vanish when he turns it around on his finger. Then he takes advantage of the possession of this ring, seduces the queen, and carries out a plot with her to kill the king and rule the land. Rather than single out the shepherd as an especially unjust man, the story goes on to assert that, given enough time, even the "best" of us would give into the enabling power of such a ring. Virtue, it seems, goes no deeper than our fear of being caught. The ring can significantly reduce our fear—to the point of emboldening us to wrong others with apparent impunity.

The second story is about David Hume's sensible knave.[8] The sensible knave does not have a ring that can make him invisible. However, we can imagine that he would eagerly welcome having one. But, absent this, we are to see him as sensible and prudent. He fully recognizes the need for protective laws and for general order in society. We all can benefit from an orderly republic in which people can count on one another to do their part, refrain from harming one another, and the like. However, asks Hume, what about this?

> And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could
> subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are
> conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of
> iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without
> causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That
> honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many

exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

Whereas, for Plato and Aristotle, wisdom commends the virtue of justice, here the question is whether wisdom is better understood as commending cautious knavery. What would this cost the sensible knave as long as he is not caught? Hume concludes that the knave seems willing to trade his *integrity* for 'worthless toys and gewgaws'. For those who have integrity, and pride themselves in this, Hume concludes, the loss would be great; and he counts on us joining hands in condemning the sensible knave. Although publically the sensible knave will join in the protest, privately he cannot be expected to join in this rebuke of his actions. Thus characterized, the sensible knave seems already to lack the sort of integrity Hume is talking about—he offers to others only the *appearance* of being upright. As long as he does not undermine this appearance (i.e., does not get caught and remains above suspicion), he seemingly has everything he wants, including the gains from his wrongdoings. He might even believe that he has a sort of personal integrity—built around his consistent, unrelenting commitment to "looking out for number 1," *himself*.

Whatever "integrity" a sensible knave may have, it does not reflect any sort of thoroughgoing commitment *to* others—even if it is *about* others. Professional integrity presumably does reflect such commitment *to* others—and not just the *appearance* of such commitment, but the real thing. What are the marks of such commitment? Here we expect some sort of steadfastness in trying to serve others well, in ways that are in accord with the standards of one's profession. The measure of character and virtue here is how well a one lives up to the professed principles and ideals of that profession.

Let us now fast-forward to the world May describes, the highly professionalized world of today. Insofar as any professionals may be sensible knaves, they should be a cause for worry. If May is right, entry into a profession is a land of opportunity for sensible knaves. Also, it would seem that increased professionalization and specialization brings us closer to supplying some with a

virtual ring of Gyges, at least in some settings. Given our limited opportunities to "watch" experts and specialists as they work, as well as our inability to understand what we would see if we could "watch" them at work, a sensible knave might well feel he has the upper hand, much as the shepherd did.   Does the car mechanic really have to fix our car (and for how long)? Does the computer technician really have to repair our malfunctioning computer? Does the physician really have to attend carefully to our health needs? Aren't we all going to have stubborn health problems, and eventually die? Does the engineer really have to be on special lookout for problems with ignition switches or air bags in automobiles? And so on.

      Let's take a longer look at the car mechanic. John Doris challenges the notion that it is reasonable to expect this person, or anyone else for that matter, to have the sorts of robust, global moral traits that he thinks virtue ethicists commend.[9] Rather, we should settle for finding, if we can, mechanics who are honest in their work, but who, for all we know, regularly cheat on their taxes or spouses. However, Edward Slingerland comments:[10]

> We could note that Doris fails to emphasize how global this attribution of
> professional honesty already is—an "honest" mechanic not only refrains
> from adding spurious items and services to your bill but also refrains from
> stealing valuable objects from your car, replacing parts that still have some
> useful life in them, and in general putting her own financial interests above
> that of her clients.

Although Slingerland goes on to concede that an honest mechanic may not be particularly reliable or trustworthy in other areas of life, this does not seem to defeat the possibility that the mechanic, *as a professional*, possesses just the sort moral character that May would commend.

      When May puts in his plea for moral character and virtue for professionals, this has implications for sensible knaves. They would not pass the test regarding what professionals do when no one is watching, especially when there are opportunities to cheat with impunity.

      But what about those who are not thoroughgoing sensible knaves. Is it too much for us to expect them to be trustworthy professionals? It all depends, we

might say. It depends on the extent to which it has been made clear in the education of those entering the professions what the expectations are. As expressions of commitment by a profession, professional codes of ethics can help set the stage, albeit in rather general and often vague terms; and even codes of ethics are not beyond critical scrutiny and change.   The inclusion of ethics in the preparatory coursework for the particular professions can help—at least this is the hope of the accrediting agencies that require serious consideration of ethics in curricula preparing students for becoming accountants, doctors, engineers, lawyers, nurses, social workers, and the like. At some point, however, this should include focusing on ethical expectations in relation to particular professions, not just ethics in general.

We should also ask what might help prepare students to be receptive to formal educational efforts to help ready them for the ethical challenges they will likely face in professional life. It is often claimed that considerable moral development needs to occur long before formal education for particular professions begins. Ethics education for engineering students, for example, is unlikely to make its mark on 18-22 year-old sensible knaves.

Consider a fictional candidate for eventually becoming a full-blown sensible knave in early adulthood. This is 6 year-old Calvin from the old *Calvin and Hobbes* comic strip.   In one scenario, we see Calvin's mother effusively praising him for making his bed. This is noticed by stuffed tiger Hobbes, Calvin's best friend and would-be mentor, if only Calvin would allow this. After his mother has left them alone, Hobbes expresses surprise at her enthusiastic response. Calvin comments: "That's the way I like it—impress her by fulfilling the least of my obligations." Noted for insisting that his first principle is, "Look out for No. 1," Calvin may be even more of a moral minimalist than the bed-making scenario explicitly reveals. He has smoothed out his blanket. But what is underneath? A crumpled set of sheets? A single, crumpled sheet? No sheets whatsoever? "Who cares?" we can imagine him saying to Hobbes. "As long as mom doesn't pull back the covers, she'll never know the difference."

We (the husband/wife authors of this paper) laugh at this portrayal of the fictional six-year-old Calvin. We even jokingly tell each other that we have "Calvinized" our bed when we simply smooth over the covers. But no one expects anything more than this from us—we just want the bed to *look* unmussed. Not for others, just a tidy, neat appearance for ourselves. Nothing significant seems to be at stake.

However, what if six-year-old Calvin retains his ways, not only in making his bed, but also in fulfilling his "obligations" generally. Imagine him 20 years later, still "Calvinizing" his bed—and virtually everything else. Like Hume's sensible knave, Calvin wants to "look good" to others, but this requires only that his workmanship *appears* to be good, beyond suspicion, beyond challenge. Smart as he is, Calvin now realizes that he is the beneficiary of a system of law (and morality) that needs to be sustained—for *his* good. So, he will not knowingly do anything that seriously jeopardizes this. However, like Hume's sensible knave, he realizes that there may be times when he is able to benefit from secretly making himself an exception to the rules. However, now he is an accountant, or an engineer, or a lawyer, or a medical professional. We might be none-the-wiser—he wasn't our child, and we had no real opportunity to detect the depth of his youthful knavery. But if we knew what he is really like, would we find him trustworthy as a professional?

It is one thing to laugh at a comic-strip that portrays a child like Calvin. It is quite another to have to live with such a child. Would we want our child to be like this? Would we wish that we could raise our child to become a sensible knave as an adult? Would we want to entrust our well-being or safety to such an adult—as a doctor, a nurse, a lawyer, an accountant, an engineer, or any other kind of professional? We expect more (and better) than this from the professionals on whom we depend. They promise (profess) more than this by proclaiming themselves to be professionals.

Now imagine grown-up Calvin fitting the description of Immanuel Kant's "prudent steward":[11]

> Suppose someone recommends you a man as steward, as a man to whom you
> can blindly trust all your affairs, and, in order to inspire you with confidence,

extols him as a prudent man who thoroughly understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably active that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it….you would either believe that the recommender was mocking you, or that he had lost his senses.

Such a "prudent steward" has enough consistency in character and behavior that we might concede that he has a kind of integrity (or consistent "wholeness")—just as Hume's sensible knave does. However, as with Hume's sensible knave, what is missing is the kind of integrity that can be fairly characterized as *moral*.

What should be noted here is that Kant is not asking us to consider the steward simply as a person. Rather, he is focusing on the steward *as a steward*—as we might consider someone *as a professional*. It might well be the case that such a steward would operate in the same way outside of this professional setting. But we need not concern ourselves with this in assessing the question of whether he exhibits *professional* integrity.

What are the marks of professional integrity? It seems unnecessary to determine whether our prudent steward cheats at cards or golf—or lies to his spouse about this or that. Finding out that the prudent steward does such things may cause us to wonder about his professional integrity, but this alone would hardly settle the matter. So, when "situationists" cite empirical research that raises serious questions about whether people actually have, or are capable of having, "robust" virtues that are operative in all sorts of circumstances, regardless of context, what we need to bear in mind is that professional settings are not everything. Perhaps, as it is sometimes alleged, someone who is amoral, if not immoral, in a business setting might well be a loving, reliable spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, or member of a religious organization. What we are considering here is the possibility that it could go the other way, as well.

However, difficult it may be to believe that there are no causal connections across different spheres of one's life, it seems unnecessary to insist that we cannot determine if someone has professional virtues until we know if these virtues cut across other areas of one's life. That is, the virtues William F. May says are needed in professional life need not be construed as "global" or "robust" in the ways that

situationists question. To see what virtues are needed, it makes most sense to focus more narrowly on the contexts within which professionals, as professionals, work.[12]

Despite the limited scope of professional virtues as such, it needs to be borne in mind that tomorrow's professionals are today's children; and children's moral development begins at a very early age. What, if anything, can today's parents, teachers, and other influential adults do to help prepare tomorrow's professionals for the moral challenges they will face? First, whether they are to become professionals or not, discouraging children from becoming sensible knaves is essential. Notice that we say 'becoming'. We do not assume that, from the outset children are sensible knaves, or even knaves at all. Plausible theories of child development do not start with this sort of deficit in the child. Of course, some children may develop knavish tendencies (and all of us have our knavish moments). So, there are problems to be addressed. At the very least, sensible knaves are capable of much mischief, if not serious wrongdoing. However, a *sensible* knave has already developed rather sophisticated rational abilities. Those with such rational abilities can normally be expected also to have had some experiences in sharing, caring, refraining from causing harm, keeping one's word, and accepting responsibility for one's actions--all important in one's moral development. Adults in children's lives can both model the desired behavior and help children come to understand its importance. Fortunately, most children exhibit some compassion for others without requiring "instruction." In their admittedly limited spheres of experience, most children have a rather robust sense of fair play, sense of being wronged, sense of gratitude, a propensity to trust others, and a desire to be trusted by others—again, without special instruction.[13] This can be reinforced by adults (and playmates), discussed in school, church, and home—and among children at play. All of this works against children growing up to be sensible knaves.

However, this does not mean that students will necessarily be well prepared to handle ethical issues as professionals without explicit attention being given professional ethics as a subject of study. As students prepare to become professionals (lawyers, doctors, engineers, accountants), the importance of ethics in professional life can be stressed in both pre-professional and professional classes.

Of course, if by this time students have not developed at least a minimal moral competence and concern, it may be doubted whether the study of ethics in this or that profession will have much take. However, for the rest (the vast majority), the study of ethics can be significant.

If May's concern about professionals not being "watched" in much of what they do is well founded, then an exploration of the sorts of qualities of character and virtues that are needed for responsible professional practice should be a part of the educational agenda in preparing students for professional life. Also important is the exploration of the sorts of obstacles to responsible practice professionals need to recognize and attempt to overcome.[14] None of this can ensure that young professionals will end up passing May's test about what professionals do when no one is watching. However, it increases the odds that, if they fail this test, they will do so with their eyes open, and this may create possibilities for positive change.

What can we hope for from those who face the ethical challenges of professional life with their eyes open? Here Adam Smith, one of David Hume's 18th century Scottish contemporaries, is very suggestive. Noting that, although we desire the moral approval of others, Smith insists that morality requires that we desire what *ought* to be approved of, not just what is approved.[15] But, he adds, seriously trying to fulfill this second desire requires trying to become "impartial spectators of our own character and conduct." Smith is quite aware of how difficult this is, especially by ourselves. Self-deception is an ever-present threat:[16]

> This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life. If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise endure the sight.

For Smith, a good way of contending with this natural inclination toward self-deception is to subject oneself to the critical scrutiny of others. They are our "mirrors". Undertaken alone, self-scrutiny is as likely to result in rationalization as self-revelation. However, placing all of this on the educational agenda, especially as a subject of discussion, can move students in the direction of the sort of self-awareness that puts them on alert and, if Smith is right, can encourage them to seek

"reformation" rather than uncritical acceptance of the self-deception that might otherwise prevail. Applied to the context of professional ethics, what Smith would count on today is that, in the end, those preparing for the professions want actually to merit, not just win, the approval of others in their professional work. "This self-approbation, if not the only, is at least the principal object, about which he can or ought to be anxious. The love of it, is the love of virtue."[17]

Smith's plea for "the love of virtue" is likely best understood as a plea for the sorts of robust, global virtues that are challenged by situationist critics.[18] However, our view of professional integrity does not depend on these sorts of virtues. Regardless of whether there are such virtues, the virtues required for professional integrity are more "local". They are virtues *within* a professional context, understood in relation to moral standards and ideals of particular professions. The question of whether, ultimately, these more local virtues are connected with more global virtues can be left open. However, the determination of the robustness of professional virtues does not seem to depend on the outcome of that question.

Situationists such as John Doris are more friendly toward local virtues. It is interesting that the empirical studies that he and others cite in their attack on robust, global virtues are not focused directly on professionals. What inferences, if any, that can reasonably be made from these studies about the lives of professionals, as professionals, remains to be determined. To take just one example, the famous dime study has randomly selected subjects whose behavior is observed after they either do or do not find a dime in a phone booth.[19] The question is whether finding a dime makes it more likely that they, as they leave the phone booth, will help a stranger pick up his or her dropped file. Aside from there being a remarkably small number of subjects in the study, there is the problem of comparing the setting of this study with a professional setting. The would-be helper and the person who has dropped the file have no previous relationship at all, professional or otherwise. Unlike cases in which medical professionals come upon those injured in accidents, there is no profession whose standards require one to provide assistance to those who drop their files or other belongings. It would seem to be good if help were volunteered, although there might be some concern that not everyone who drops a

(possibly confidential?) file in such circumstances would welcome the assistance of a stranger. Or there might be concern that coming to another's aid might only add further embarrassment to someone who already is feeling clumsy at having dropped the file.   In any case, the comparison of this set of circumstances with a professional setting seems quite problematic.

The widely discussed Milgram studies might seem more promising in shedding light on character and virtue in professional life.[20] However, in these studies the professional involved (the experimenter) is not the subject of study. It is the "teacher" who is being studied, and the circumstances are highly unusual. Are professionals, *as professionals*, as susceptible to complying with "authority" as the general public seems to be? Perhaps. But the Milgram studies alone do not show this. Furthermore, the intense discomfort experienced by many "teachers" who, nevertheless, did not withdraw from the study suggests that the experimenter faced the challenge of overcoming the subjects' resistance to continuing.   To say that they were largely successful does not show that moral character and virtue were absent in the subjects—only that they were not enough in this case. But, again, the subjects were not assuming the role of professionals in this study.

If we look at examples of professionals working in large organizations, we may find examples that seem to support applying Milgram's findings to professionals in their roles as professionals.   For example, in 1959 General Motors (GM) released its infamous Corvair [the featured automobile in Ralph Nadar's *Unsafe at Any Speed* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1965)]. In 1979, John DeLorean, a top executive and engineer at GM during the Corvair era, published an account of the internal controversy among engineers at GM about safety regarding the design of the Corvair.[21] DeLorean recounts:

> On the one side of the argument was Chevrolets's then General Manager, Ed
> Cole, an engineer and product innovator. He and some of his engineering
> colleagues were enthralled with the idea of building the first modern, rear-
> engine, American car. And I am convinced they felt the safety risks of the
> swing-axle suspension were minimal. On the other side was a wide
> assortment of top-flight engineers,...

These men collectively and individually made vigorous attempts inside GM to keep the Corvair, as designed, out of production or to change the suspension system to make the car safer. One top corporate engineer told me that he showed his test results to Cole but by then, he said, "Cole's mind was made up."

Likely there was significant pressure placed on the dissenting engineers to defer to the judgment of those who wanted to go ahead with the design. Eventually Cole had his way with upper management. The dissenters apparently retreated into silence (not to be confused with agreement), being told , in effect, says DeLorean, by management to "stop these objections. Get on the team, or you can find someplace else to work."

However, as described by DeLorean, the GM dynamics were very different from Milgram's. Management's hold on the dissenting engineers was much stronger than Milgram's authority figure on the "teachers". The engineers' jobs were on the line. They also were part of an engineering team that had long-term responsibilities as professional employees of the organization. The "teachers" were not part of a team, had a very limited role (as individual volunteers) in the experiment, were not functioning as employees of a larger organization, and had no long-term stake in going along with the experiment. DeLorean gives no evidence for concluding that the dissenting engineers changed their minds about what was best. Nor does he suggest that they had the power *within* GM to bring production to a halt. Perhaps they contemplated "blowing the whistle," but this raises other ethical questions, questions of loyalty and being a good team player among others (as upper management seems to have pressed). At the same time, it seems evident that the dissenting engineers took very seriously their professional obligation to try to protect public safety, health, and welfare (now featured in virtually all engineering codes of ethics as the engineer's "paramount duty").

In 1986, O-Ring engineer Roger Boisjoly stopped trying to block the launch of the Challenger space shuttle once he was clearly out-numbered by his engineering team and his engineer-manager made the decision to recommend going ahead with the launch. He did not change his engineering judgment that launching would be

too risky, but he later said that he felt he had done all that he could do in objecting to the launch. "Blowing the whistle" was apparently not regarded a viable option by Boisjoly, or his colleague Alan MacDonald [author of *Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Disaster*, with James R. Hansen (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012)]. Despite not "blowing the whistle" prior to the fateful launch, Boisjoly and MacDonald seem to have exhibited much conscientiousness and courage. At the same time, it has not been shown these virtues were lacking in their engineering colleagues. To show that, it would be necessary to show either that they were less than conscientious or that, despite agreeing with the engineering judgments of Boisjoly and MacDonald, they simply went along with what they thought those in higher positions of authority wanted. All of this suggests that questions about whether (and to what extent) character and virtue may be in play in actual situations in professional life are quite complicated.

In any case, it would seem that it is premature to conclude that robust, "local" virtues are no more promising for professional life than robust, global virtues.[22] Meanwhile, can Hume's challenge of the sensible knave, Plato's story of the Ring of Gyges, or Kant's prudent steward help students understand William F. May's plea for moral character and virtue in the professions? It would seem so. Here is where instructors can engage students as an allies in making the case for the importance of professional integrity. Most students are not sensible knaves. They can see that a sensible knave would not be a trustworthy professional. They should be able to appreciate May's concerns—and the responsibilities that, as May would put it, come from acquiring the "relatively inaccessible power" of being a professional. Of course, as May points out, "it is possible to devise structures that limit the opportunities for the abuse of specialized knowledge," but such external devices do not eliminate all such opportunities. Here we can hope, with May, that further opposition can come from within.

Endnotes:

1 William F. May, "Professional Virtue and Self-Regulation." In *Ethical Issues in Professional Life*, edited by Joan Callahan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 408-411.

2 Ibid., p. 408.

3 Damien Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael P. Levine, *Integrity and the Fragile Self* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p. 103.

4 Ibid., p. 104.

5 James Wallace, *Ethical Norms, Particular Cases* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 79.

6 See, e.g., John Doris, *Lack of Character* (Cambridge, 2002); Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 99: 315-333; and Christopher Miller, *Character and Moral Psychology* (Oxford, 2014).

7 Plato, *The Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1974), p. 32.

8 David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (in *Hume's Enquiries*), edited by Paul Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 282-3.

9 Doris, *Lack of Character*, p. 115.

10 Edward Slingerland, "The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics," *Ethics*, Vol. 121, No. 2, January 20ll, p. 401.

11 Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. By Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, 1889, pp. 124-5. Cited in Emma Rothschild, "Condorcet and Adam Smith on Education," in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., *Philosophers on Education* (Routledge: New York, 2000), p. 213.

12 Imagine a "prudent steward" as a golfer. Will he or she cheat in golf when no one is looking? Perhaps. But we could easily imagine otherwise. Suppose that he or she really aspires to be legitimately recognized as the best golfer in the area—as judged by the standards of Bobby Jones, the famous amateur champion who insisted that one must "play it as it lies". Jones himself was a lawyer, not a golfer, by profession. But, given the accounts of his life overall, it would be surprising to discover that he lacked professional integrity after all.

13 For further discussion of the moral development of children along these lines, see, for example, Michael S. Pritchard, *Reasonable Children* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

14 On this, see Patricia Werhane, Laura Hartman, Crina Archer, Elaine E. Englehardt, and Michael S. Pritchard, *Obstacles to Ethical Decision Making* (Cambridge, 2013).

15 Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1984), p. 114.

16 Ibid., pp. 158-9.

17 Ibid., p. 117.

18 We say this even though aware of Gilbert Harman's deep admiration of Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, along with his serious questioning of the empirical standing of robust, global moral character.

[19] Isen, A.M. and Levin, P.F. (1972) "Effects of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 21: pp.384-388.

[20] See Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

[21] In J. Patrick Wright, *On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors* (Avon Books, 1979). The passages cited here can be found in John DeLorean, "How Moral Men Make Immoral Decisions," in *Ethics in Life*, 4th ed., edited by Elaine E. Englehardt and Donald D. Shmeltekopf (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2010), pp. 367-368.

[22] It is unclear how studies of the sort that situationists cite could be set up to test whether robust, but possibly more "local", virtues regularly show up in professional life. However, a more promising route than setting up "experiments" for exploring this would be to undertake "field studies" of professionals—accounts of how they actually conduct themselves in professional practice. This is the sort of work that William Damon and Ann Colby have done in trying to familiarize us with the lives of "exemplars" [e.g., in their *Some do Care* (New York: Free Press, 1992), and their forthcoming *The Power of Ideals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)]. It is worth noting that, in line with an interest in character and virtue, their work concentrates on long-term commitment and behavior rather than individual incidents. But such studies need not be restricted to well-known "exemplars". Studies of more ordinary, but morally commendable, professionals should be welcome, as well.