Aristotle and the Two Thomases: Case Studies in Reappropriating Eudaimonia for Our Age

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Many people are sympathetic to Aristotle's moral, social, and political thought. Some parts of his account have long resonated with our lived experience and increasingly appear to be confirmed by contemporary behavioral science.[i] At the same time, we recognize that there are other parts of his account that are implausible, owing to advances in both our moral judgments and our science. Reconciling the attractive elements with obvious implausibilities is challenging. Nevertheless, a number of scholars have reconfigured and adjusted Aristotle's account in order preserve the elements that we respect and abandon those that we do not. Call these scholars *neo-Aristotelian*; call the project *neo-Aristotelianism*; and count me a proponent.

In this paper, I present Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Hill (T.H.) Green as two helpful models of reconfiguration that preserve the appealing elements of Aristotle's account of eudaimonia while making the changes necessary to solve important problems. These problems, it seems to me, fall into two categories. Some are internal to the account itself—problems recognized by Aristotle and his contemporaries. Others arise externally: later thinkers with different assumptions encounter problems of compatibility with these assumptions. Aquinas and Green are instructive across both types of problem. I will begin with a brief sketch of Aristotle's account of eudaimonia, together with an account of some of the central problems that his account generates. I will then discuss Aquinas and Green in turn, noting the specific ways that they modify Aristotle's elements in order to solve these problems. To be clear: it is not my aim here to provide a comprehensive reckoning or to offer a novel neo-Aristotelian model. Instead, I aim to show that Aristotle's account has the kind of flexibility that permits adaptation in the face of some types of criticism and to remind readers of—or introduce readers to—two adaptations worthy of consideration as they contemplate generating neo-Aristotelian models of their own. (*Note to the reader: a project of this kind could easily become bogged down by quotations. To keep the argument moving along,*

I have kept quotations—especially of Aristotle—to a minimum but provide ample citations in the endnotes.)

I. I. Aristotle

The ancient Greek concept of *eudaimonia*, often translated as happiness, is better interpreted as flourishing or thriving. Aristotle says it is a matter of living well or doing well.[ii] He adds that there is disagreement among the Greeks as to what kind of life best accomplishes eudaimonia;[iii] the principal aim of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is to identify and defend a specific account of the happy life. Aristotle's account can be best summarized with a review of three elements: teleology, function, and community.

Teleology. The *telos* of a thing is its end or purpose. It is the ideal toward which a thing with a telos aims; the fulfillment of one's telos involves the achievement, acquisition, or cultivation of the good or goods that constitute the telos. Not everything has a telos, but according to Aristotle, human beings do and it is eudaimonia.[iv] There are ambiguities in Aristotle's account that make it difficult to say precisely what the good or goods are that constitute eudaimonia[v] and make it especially hard to differentiate between goods that contribute to the achievement of eudaimonia (i.e., the means) and goods that constitute a eudaimonic life (i.e., the ends). These interpretive debates notwithstanding, there are at least two things we can say definitively about Aristotle's account of eudaimonia.

Function. First, the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia derives in the first instance from an account of excellence in those activities and practices that are uniquely human.[vi] Insofar as humans are complex organisms with physical, mental, and behavioral dimensions, we can identify a host of functions that might serve as targets of excellence. For example, as intelligent creatures, we can strive for excellence in our intellectual faculties. As emotional creatures, we can strive for the excellence of our emotional faculties. As physical creatures, we can strive for excellence in our physical faculties. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle describes the excellences attached to our faculties of appetite and desire, explaining that

these faculties achieve excellence when they are well regulated by practical reason.[vii] These distinct sources of excellence in function give rise to the catalog of moral virtues[viii]—a catalog that we can expand and clarify as we recognize with greater precision the variety of our distinct faculties. He also identifies excellences attached to our rational faculties alone: the intellectual virtues. Together with the moral virtues, the complete catalog defines human excellence. Notably, this excellence is not merely a matter of individual excellence: for Aristotle, humans are a social or political species.[ix] In other words, our roles in our human communities can also serve as focuses for traits in the catalog of the virtues.

Community. The second definitive thing that we can say about Aristotle's eudaimonia is that it is a group achievement. Human beings are by nature dependent creatures whose function requires close partnership with others. Aristotle distinguishes three dimensions of sociality, each of which supplies distinct social functions that entail specific goods and excellences. The most basic social relation is that of the family or household.[x] It is in our families that we find others committed to our individual goods and in whose goods we are ourselves committed. Before I am anything else, I am a child, a sibling, a spouse, a parent, and so on. These roles (given and chosen) determine in the first instance the set of goods that I will pursue and the people with whom I will pursue them. The next ring of relationships is the village: the cluster of families who are together committed to a set of common goods unique to their local environment.[xi] It is in the village that we find the work and play and the neighbors needed to sustain the basic needs and pursuits of our family. The final ring, on Aristotle's account, is the city: the cluster of villages that are together self-sufficient and constitute a single organic whole.[xii] In the city, we partner with other villages to secure those public goods necessary for sustaining our pursuit of the goods of the village and the family. To be sure: there will also be common goods recognized and pursued merely in terms of our roles as citizens. But our commitments are first to our families and our villages. In other words, Aristotle's approach to the social product is guided by a nested priority of special relationships. To be sure: aliens from outside my city are still due certain privileges; the ancient virtue of hospitality was grounded in the recognition that we have duties to others merely in terms of their humanity. But

eudaimonia and its associated goods are to be achieved, for Aristotle, in an intensely local and special social setting. We take care of our ant hill before we take care of the hills of others ants.

II. II. Problems with Aristotle

Adapting Aristotle to fit our modern conditions begins with a taxonomy of the problems with his account. I focus here on those problems that might discourage one from embracing Aristotle's view of eudaimonia, rather than problems of interpretation (which are legion) that might require editorial decision-making or problems of completeness that might require creativity or discretionary judgment in order to extend the account to cover issues that Aristotle did not anticipate. At the same time, I will focus exclusively on those problems that will be relevant to Aquinas and Green as case studies in neo-Aristotelian adaptation.

We can identify internal problems with Aristotle's account as well as external problems generated through genuine advances in moral, scientific, and religious thought. Internally, two problems are of special concern: the fragility of happiness and the arbitrariness of universal prescription and proscription. Similarly, two problems will be of special concern externally. First is the development and spread of Abrahamic religious traditions; second is the development of the modern nation-state. Let us consider each these problems in turn.

First, consider the fragility of happiness. On Aristotle's approach, happiness appears hard to achieve and easy to lose. More specifically, since achieving happiness depends on a healthy social and political community,[xiii] an adequate supply of the "good things necessary for life,"[xiv] and the continuing success of one's projects and relations even after death,[xv] there are too many ways that happiness can be undercut. In other words, luck plays an enormous and negative role on Aristotle's account: it takes quite a bit of good luck to succeed and only a bit of bad luck to fail.[xvi] Many later thinkers, especially the Stoics, regarded the fragility of happiness as the chief problem with Aristotle's account and developed their approaches as a direct response to this perceived weakness.[xvii]

Second, consider the arbitrariness of universal prescription and proscription. Aristotle's account of happiness, together with the virtues that constitute and achieve happiness, does not include an account of rights, obligations, and liberties. To be sure: Aristotle himself recognizes that some actions, e.g., adultery and murder, are "base," which is to say that they are regarded as unconditionally forbidden.[xviii] But his theory does not provide a coherent way to justify these rules in particular or any rule in general. As a result, rights, obligations, and liberties appear to be arbitrary attachments to Aristotle's moral account. On the one hand, many contemporary moral theorists appeal to mixed approaches or the pluralism of value such that they need not seek out a general theory that explains every aspect of our moral judgments. But on the other hand, a moral theory whose elements are an arbitrary collection seems inelegant at best and incomplete at worst. At the very least, some philosophers and moralists seeking truth and progress will want more.

Third, consider the rise of Abrahamic faith traditions. Two prominent features of these traditions raise external problems for Aristotle's account. First is the idea of a personal and engaged deity. In these traditions, God has an active moral, social, historical, and political role in human affairs. He is creator and sustainer; he has sent prophets, priests, and kings to educate, organize, and correct human communities. As a result, Aristotle's socio-political whole of the city-state composed exclusively of human beings will be an inadequate picture of the real nature human community. Second is the idea of a continuing life after death. While there is significant disagreement among these faith traditions, they hold in common the view that physical death is not the final end of human existence, nor are our actions significant only for their effects on the here and now. Instead, our actions also have consequences for the afterlife (whatever it may include). At the same time, the happiness that is possible for us in the afterlife is regarded as vastly superior to whatever happiness can be achieved now. This approach to happiness is a significant departure from Aristotle. On his account, our actions, together with whatever happiness we can achieve through them, is limited to this life here.

Finally, consider the rise of the modern nation state. Nearly all of humanity now lives inside a large, bureaucratic, Westphalian, constitutionally-informed, ethnically diverse nation-state. Aristotle, by contrast, argues that the maxim size for a community is one that can be "…easily surveyed as a whole."[xix] In other words, he argues that eudaimonia will best be achieved in small independent city-states. But in the modern world of large and diverse nation-states as well as large and diverse cities, Aristotle's eudaimonia would appear to be unavailable. In other words, Aristotle's politics (which is inseparable from his ethics[xx]) is a non-starter in the contemporary world. Proposals to return to a city-state model of community organization appear quaint at best. Moreover, not only is the nation-state a given in contemporary social and political theory and practice, but the nation-state model appears to have steadily increased in permanence and stability since it first gained currency in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). These facts appear to belie Aristotle's objection that large states will unable to sustain constitutions.[xxi] In other words, Aristotle's argument against large states appears to have been defeated by our centuries of experience with them.

III. III. The Gateway to Neo

Movement from Aristotle to neo-Aristotelianism begins with the recognition that we can excise the contingent elements of his account (the parts we do not like) from the essential elements of his account (the parts we do like). For example, Aristotle quite infamously believed that women were naturally inferior to men. He also believed that Asians and Africans were naturally inferior to Greeks: some men were naturally predisposed to no better life than that of a slave and those with intellectual and moral virtues were naturally superior to those without them. On the basis of this anthropology, Aristotle argued in favor of an elitist socio-political structure in which the distribution of rights, liberties, and opportunities was organized hierarchically according to race, class and gender. Many commentators have taken these errors to be reasons to reject Aristotle's moral and political theory outright, seeing it as little different

from the patriarchal and oppressive political systems that we have been increasingly rejecting for centuries.

Obviously, we are right in rejecting Aristotle's anthropology: it must be condemned both by advances in science and advances in our moral judgment. However, this condemnation need not entail the rejection of Aristotle's approach altogether. As neo-Aristotelians explain, Aristotle's objectionable anthropology turns out to be among the contingent features of his approach that can be excised without loss to the essence. For example, the pseudo differences that Aristotle observed in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender can be replaced with a scientifically accurate account of our functional differences.[xxii] What matters for Aristotle is not his specific catalog of differences in human function, but instead the idea that human function supplies groundwork for an account of human excellence. In this way, Aristotle's account is analogous to a shirt on a hanger. His mistaken views, the shirt, can be removed from the hanger, and replaced with a shirt that is morally and scientifically accurate: a new shirt. The result has the same underlying structure and implications, but the revised garment is a much better fit.

Provided that we agree on which elements of Aristotle's account are essential and which elements are contingent, we can distinguish between genuine neo-Aristotelian adaptations that preserve the essentials and rejections or pseudo-adaptations that discard the essentials or treat contingent elements as if they were essential. The sketch I offered in Part One implies that the essential elements in Aristotle's account are teleology, function, and community. Any account that discards one or more of these elements will count as a rejection of Aristotle altogether rather than an adaptation. For example, consider John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory. On first glance, his approach appears to be neo-Aristotelian, insofar as he defends happiness as our ultimate end. However, his explanation of happiness, while forward-looking, is not teleological in Aristotle's sense, nor is it grounded in functional excellence. Moreover, while Mill has quite a bit to say about human community, it is not at all clear from his account that humanity is as necessary for human flourishing as it is on Aristotle's account. While Mill does not explicitly say that he

is rejecting Aristotle's approach, this is clearly the import of the utilitarian doctrine. Perhaps we might call Mill's approach a pseudo-adaptation.

IV. IV. Thomas Aquinas

Our first neo-Aristotelian case study is the approach offered by Thomas Aquinas, the medieval Christian scholar who famously synthesized Greek thinking—especially Aristotle—and the Christian theological tradition. Aquinas presents a wide-ranging engagement with Aristotle, regarding him as an important but fallible authority with respect to a host of issues. Aquinas's adaptation is especially sensitive to the internal worry that happiness is too fragile and the external worry that Aristotle's approach is incompatible with the assumptions of Christian doctrine and practice. Let us consider each of these challenges in turn.

Aquinas solves the first problem by distinguishing perfect happiness from imperfect happiness. With respect to the question, "Is the body necessary for happiness?" he writes: "Happiness is of two kinds: an imperfect one which is had in this life, and a perfect one which consists in the vision of God."[xxiii] Perfect happiness, on the one hand, lies within each person's grasp. Aquinas explains:

> Happiness means the attainment of the perfect good. Accordingly, whoever has a capacity for the perfect good can attain happiness. That man has a capacity for the perfect good is evident from the fact that his intellect apprehends the universal and perfect good, and his will seeks it. Hence, man can attain happiness. It is also evident from the fact that man has a capacity for seeing the divine essence…. We have also pointed out that the perfect or complete happiness of man consists in this vision.[xxiv]

By itself, this passage is somewhat ambiguous as to whether this perfect happiness is available to people here and now or whether it is restricted to the afterlife. But in reply #2 in the same question, he clarifies:

"According to his present state of life, man's connatural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another way of knowing connatural to him…"[xxv] Imperfect happiness, on the other hand, is just as fragile as Aristotle's critics believe. In considering the question, "Can one be happy in this life?" Aquinas writes:

> Some participation in happiness can be had in this life, but true and perfect happiness cannot be had in this life…. The present life is subject to many evils which cannot be avoided…. Likewise, the desire for good cannot be fully satisfied in this life, for man naturally desires that the good he has to be permanent… Hence it is impossible for true happiness to be had in this life.[xxvi]

Notice the way that Aquinas has navigated the challenge to Aristotle. He agrees with critics—and with Aristotle himself—that eudaimonia in this life is imperfect, fragile, and easily lost. But by reframing the achievement of perfect eudaimonia in the afterlife, he finds an ultimate end with the security and permanence that the concept of the chief good would seem to entail.

Turn now to the second problem, the incompatibility of theism and revealed religion with Aristotle's own views. This territory has been discussed ably by others; there is no special need to rehearse the details of his moves here.[xxvii] Let me focus instead on two aspects of Aquinas's adaptation project relevant to our regard for Aquinas as a neo-Aristotelian.

First, adaptation is probably a smaller concept than what Aquinas does with Aristotle. Aquinas brings a rich and complex doctrinal tradition into conversation with Aristotle. The result is not so much an adaptation of Aristotle as much as it is a synthesis of Aristotle with this tradition. Nevertheless, the essential elements of the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia: teleology, function, and community, are not demoted or suppressed in Aquinas's work, they are instead elevated and renovated, as if Aristotle saw "through a glass but darkly"[xxviii] and the encounter with the Christian tradition took those concepts and reconditioned them for a fuller and more accurate understanding in the light of revealed truth.

Second, a comparison of the table of contents of the discussion of happiness in the *Summa* (often referred to as the "Treatise on Happiness") with the organizational structure of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* suggests that Aquinas intentionally followed Aristotle's own outline as he wrote it. To be sure: the project is synthetic rather than adaptive and Aquinas brings to bear a number of additional scholars and authorities to think through the questions associated with eudaimonia. But we should not miss the fact that Aristotle's work appears to be the frame through which Aquinas carries out his synthetic project. In other words, while it is certainly true that Aquinas's project brings together a host of previous thinkers, it is still the case that the foundation on which Aquinas builds his project is that of Aristotle. In this way, he supplies a model of how one might adapt Aristotle to fit a new set of conditions and assumptions without discarding the essential features of Aristotle's approach.

V. V. Thomas Hill Green

Of the two figures considered here, T.H. Green is likely the least well-known to contemporary moral, social, and political thinkers. There are several interconnected reasons for this. One is his relatively early death at 55. While his corpus is interesting and provocative, it is also underdeveloped. A second reason is his association with the British Idealist movement. Idealism flourished in Britain during the latter half of the 19th century, but it was rather thoroughly extinguished during the first half of the 20th century by the luminaries G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, together with a series of social and political movements and events that were deeply disruptive to the previous intellectual order. Aristotelian moral, social, and political projects, it seems to me, work best under conditions of stability, incrementalism, and subsidiarity—conditions that were absent through two world wars and the rise (and subsequent fall and subsequent return) of totalitarian, nationalist, and dictatorial regimes.

But a forgotten idea is not, for this reason, unimportant or irrelevant. Falling out of fashion does not mean that the argument was defeated. Perhaps J.S. Mill is right that truth will eventually win the day,

but this doesn't mean that truth doesn't occasional spend time in the wilderness of illiberal suppression or the emotivist capriciousness.

Green's approach to moral, social, and political theory was framed by the British Idealist tradition, which was in turn informed by Hegel, who in turn regarded his approach as informed by Aristotle. In this way, Green's adaptation of Aristotle is intentional. He writes:

> It was because Plato and Aristotle conceived of the life of the polis so clearly as the telos of the individual, relation to which makes him what he is – the relation in the case of the *polites* proper being a conscious or recognized relation – that they laid the foundation for all true theory of 'rights.'[xxix]

To be sure: Green recognizes that Aristotle did not himself develop an explicit theory of rights. What makes Green an interesting case study for us is the way that he explains the importance of constitutionally guaranteed human rights in a recognizably Aristotelian political framework, but one adapted to the circumstances of the modern nation-state. In this way, he will solve both our internal worry about the arbitrary nature of universal prescriptions and proscriptions as well as our external worry about the modern nation-state.

Let us begin with Green's solution to the problem of universal prescriptions and proscriptions, especially as these are cataloged in the modern world as rights, obligations, and liberties. He frames rights as means to achieving our telos, rather than as constituents or independent ends in themselves. He writes:

> There is a system of rights and obligations which should be maintained by law, whether it is so or not, and which may properly be called 'natural,' not in the sense in which the term 'natural' would imply that such a system every did exist or could exist independently of force exercised by society over individuals, but 'natural' because necessary to the end which it is the vocation of human society to realize.[xxx]

Notice two things in this passage. First, Green points out that there is something human society aims to achieve. In this way, he argues—following Aristotle—that there is a telos toward which human community is aimed. Second, Green's use of the term "natural" corresponds quite closely to Aristotle's idea of function. For Aristotle, a thing's function is given by its nature and its nature is available for us to discover through empirical investigation (broadly understood). For Green, natural laws and natural rights are protections and obligations that are essential to the achievement or realization of our "vocation," or as he says elsewhere, toward the achievement of the common good.[xxxi] At the same time, these rights and laws also aim at the cultivation of excellent character. Green writes:

> …the claim or right of the individual to have certain powers secured to him by society, and the counter-claim of society to exercise certain powers over the individual, alike rest on the fact that these powers are necessary to the fulfillment of "his" vocation as a moral being, to an effectual self-devotion to the work of developing the perfect character in himself and others.[xxxii]

For Green then, rights, obligations, and liberties serve the further end of the cultivation of the character of the individual. In this way, Green has found a way to explain the connection of law to virtue and, by extension, to happiness. Laws are means to ends—both the end of the cultivation of excellent individual character and the end of the achievement of the common good in a community. Rights, obligations, and liberties can be derived from the concept of the state as vehicle for the achievement of goods, especially the common good. The primary means by which these goods are achieved is through the self-directed improvement (or self-realization, in Green's jargon) of the individual and the group-directed improvement of the group.

In this way, Green has solved the problem of arbitrariness in Aristotle's account. Rights, laws, obligations are not arbitrary additions to our moral theory. Instead, they are identified and enacted through the process of building communities aimed at the common good. Green writes:

> Aristotle regards the state (polis) as a society of which the life is maintained by what its members do for the sake of maintaining it – by functions consciously fulfilled with reference to that end, which in that sense imposes duties –and from which at the same time its members derive the ability, through education and protection, to fulfill their several functions, which in that sense confers rights.[xxxiii]

In other words, the common good toward which the state is directed includes the individual fulfillment of those functions which are specific to each citizen. As result, the state will develop a regulatory structure designed to enable citizens to fulfill these functions and this regulatory structure will consist of rights, liberties, and duties.

Consider next the problem of adapting Aristotle to fit the conditions of the modern nation-state. As Green scholar David Brink points out, Green was himself committed to the modern nation-state. Brink explains:

> Like most liberals, Green is committed to a largely secular state, democratic political institutions in which the franchise is widespread, private property rights, market economies, equal social and economic opportunity, and a variety of personal and civic liberties.[xxxiv]

Of course, a commitment to the principles of liberalism does not entail a commitment to the size of the nation-state, which appears to have been Aristotle's chief concern. But one of the features of liberalism is the scalability of the model, especially when it is combined with a federal organization and an effective principle of subsidiarity.

At issue with respect to the size of the nation-state, it seems to me, is a difference in the way that Aristotle and Green use the expression "constitution." Aristotle has in mind the organizing principles of the state that each citizen of the state has internalized: one's rational sense of citizenship, together with the organizational structure that determines one's place in the city-state. This sense of political identity

(the "constitution" of the state) can be lost if the state becomes so large that citizens can no longer grasp the organizational structure of the state. More specifically, Aristotle's assumption seems to be that our sense of political identity is established, at least in part, by our civic friendships with other citizens and with officeholders—relationships that cannot be sustained when the city-state becomes too large. When Green thinks about the concept of a constitution, on the other hand, he has in mind our familiar modern concept of foundational organizing document that includes a government structure, basic obligations, basic liberties, and basic rights. On the liberal view, we do not need discrete civic relationships with our fellow citizens and with officeholders (at least to the same extent as Aristotle) in order to have a sense of political identity and a shared commitment to the common good. Instead, what we need is a shared document or set of documents (perhaps together with a shared political history) to serve as a focus for our political identities and shared pursuits. Size does not matter provided that we have common pursuits and agree to the principles by which those pursuits might be enabled and achieved.

VI. VI. Conclusion

It was not my aim in this paper to advance a particular neo-Aristotelian view, though I am sympathetic to the moves that both Aquinas and Green make with respect to the neo-Aristotelian project. It was instead my aim to promote Aristotle as a starting point in our moral, social, and political projects, recognize that others have advanced this cause in ways that we should appreciate (and perhaps incorporate). There is a great deal of work is left for us to do in order to continue the project for our time. Even the idea of adapting Aristotle to fit new discoveries and new conditions seems to me to be Aristotelian, insofar as he had a preference for empirical research and he recognized the tentative and transitory nature of moral and political projects.

[i] Recent empirical developments of note include Dan Kahneman's work that supports the importance of intentional habit formation, i.e., *Thinking Fast and Slow* (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2013), Martin Seligman's work supporting the positive psychology movement that is focused on the empirical dimensions of happiness, e.g., *Flourish* (Atria Books 2012), and Jonathan Haidt's work on the importance of community, e.g., *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (Vintage, 2013), esp. chapters 9-10.

[ii] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a18.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid., 1098a28-30.

[vi] Ibid., 1097b23.

[vii] Ibid., 1107a1.

[viii] Ibid., 1107a29.

[ix] Ibid., 1169b20; Politics 1253a3.

[x] Politics 1252a25-35.

[xi] Ibid., 1252b15.

[xii] Ibid., 1252b26.

[xiii] Ibid., 1253a1.

[xiv] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a29.

[xv] Ibid., 1101b5.

[xvi] Ibid., 1100b21.

[xvii] Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, 1, 8, 48. (Translated by Nicholas White, Hackett Publishing, 1983.)

[xviii] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a18.

[xix] *Politics*, 1326b21.

[xx] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094b8.

[xxi] *Politics*, 1326b4.

[xxii] Green explicitly recognizes this point in "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," in *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and other Writings*, edited by Paul Harris and John Morrow (Cambridge University Press, 1986), §39.

[xxiii] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, Q4, Art 5.

[xxiv] Ibid., I-II, Q5, Art 1.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid., I-II, Q5, Art 3.

[xxvii] For example, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame University Press, 1990), pp. 105-148.

[xxviii] 1 Corinthians 13:12.

[xxix] Green, "Lectures," §39.

[xxx] T.H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation,", §9.

[xxxi] For more on Green's teleological conception of rights, see Avital Simhony, "Rights that Bind: T.H. Green on Rights and Community," in *T.H. Green, Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy*, edited by Maria Dimova-Cookson and W. J. Mander (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 244-249.

[xxxii] Green, "Lectures," §21.

[xxxiii] Ibid., §39.

[xxxiv] David O. Brink, *Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T.H. Green* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 77.